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Foreword: Why progress in the visa dialogue matters for civil society? 
By Yuri Dzhibladze (Member of the Steering Committee of EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, 
President of the Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, Moscow) 
The EU-Russia Civil Society Forum has considered progressive facilitation of the visa regime 
between Russia and the EU and concluding an agreement on visa waiver for short travel of outmost 
importance for civil society and public interests from the very beginning of the Forum’s existence 
in 2011. Civil society groups and the public need elimination of barriers hampering cooperation and 
human connections. Otherwise, reaching the Forum’s goals of building a common European 
continent based on common values is not possible. The founding statement of the Forum affirmed 
“the key role of civil society and people-to-people cooperation in the peaceful development of the 
European region and in the overcoming of dividing lines across Europe.” 
Realization of civic activists’ idealistic vision about a “world without borders” where 
cooperation, humanistic values and public interests take precedent over narrowly defined national 
interests and state sovereignty requires hard work. It cannot be left to governments alone to 
negotiate about and agree upon. Members of the public which are directly affected by dividing lines 
have an important role to play in pushing politicians and governments to negotiate, ratify and 
implement agreements that would allow people to freely travel, cooperate, learn from each other, 
and work together towards a better future. At the European continent we are still far from this ideal. 
Despite of the progress made in recent years, the existing visa regime between the EU and Russia is 
still a huge barrier for human contacts, civil society activity, business, scientific, and cultural 
cooperation. 
Non-governmental organizations have become more actively engaged lately in reflection, 
debate and advocacy on the visa issue. With the goal of providing civil society’s views to the EU 
and Russia policy-makers, the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum produced in 2011 and 2012 two 
policy papers addressed to participants of EU-Russia summits, issued two public statements on the 
visa issue, and lobbied for the release of the Common Steps towards reaching a visa-waiver 
agreement for short travels and for progress in negotiations on adoption of an amended Visa 
Facilitation Agreement. Members of the Forum have met with EU and Russian officials involved in 
the visa dialogue to present their positions.   
In order to provide professional and more in-depth policy recommendations based upon 
independent research, the Forum established at the beginning of 2013 an Expert Group on Visa 
Issues comprised of academics and civic activists from Russia, Poland, Belgium and Germany.1 In 
March 2013 the Expert Group held a seminar in Moscow which resulted, among other things, in 
production of a policy brief with recommendations on visa facilitation and progress towards visa-
free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens. The policy brief was released and presented to 
policy-makers and the public in April 2013.2 
This new report commissioned by the Steering Committee of the Forum is a result of 
intensive work of the Expert Group based on its study of existing visa regulations in the EU and 
                                                            
1 Members of the Expert Group on Visa Issues are: Joanna Fomina (Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw), Oleg Korneev 
(Marie Curie Fellow, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield), Aigulle Sembaeva (Nemecko-Russki Obmen, St. 
Petersburg), Peter Van Elsuwege (European Institute, Ghent University) and Vadim Voynikov (EU Centre, Baltic 
2 http://eu-russia-csf.org/fileadmin/Docs/Visa/CSF_visa_policy_brief_April_2013_eng_01.pdf  
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Russia, agreements between the two parties as well as their agreements with other countries, and 
analysis of best practices and shortcomings of the current visa arrangements. Importantly, it 
contains specific recommendations for further visa facilitation and progress towards visa 
liberalization between the EU and Russia. The Expert Group has worked independently and has not 
been controlled by the Steering Committee in any way. Therefore, views expressed in this report 
represent those of the authors and do not constitute an official position of the Forum. The Steering 
Committee, however, endorses the report and considers it as an excellent basis for more active 
engagement on the visa issues between civil society and government representatives for the benefit 
of the public. 
A few words of caution are necessary. The Civil Society’s Forum’s guiding principle in 
addressing the visa issue is that the public interests should always come first. Using negotiations on 
visa facilitation and liberalization as EU leverage for addressing important human rights problems 
in Russia is a tempting idea. Indeed, the visa problem is seen by quite a few stakeholders in the EU 
within a wider context of EU-Russia relations and as leverage to put pressure on Russia. This is 
especially evident in the increasingly influential European Parliament whose approval is necessary 
for any visa agreements. As much as we in the Forum strongly share human rights concerns, we 
consider this approach to be counter-productive. Putting visa negotiations on hold because of 
serious human rights problems in Russia would, in our view, punish the Russian public whose very 
interests such position intends to protect. Instead, it is the human rights violators in the governments 
that should be held accountable. While millions of Russian and EU citizens should benefit from 
progress in the visa dialogue, more effective and targeted mechanisms should be applied to bring 
the perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. We have demanded for a long time that 
human rights issues should be given a higher priority on the agenda of EU-Russia dialogue. 
However, we believe that there should be no direct conditionality between implementation of 
human rights commitments and reaching agreements on the visa issue. In addition, we believe that 
the more Russians travel to Europe and vice versa, the more chances there are that respect for 
democratic and human rights values in Russia will increase.   
Guided by the same principle, the Steering Committee of the Forum believes it is of utmost 
importance that negotiations on the amended Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) do not put 
interests of the service passport holders first but are aimed at improving the situation of ordinary 
citizens. Granting the privilege of visa free movement to government officials and members of 
similar privileged categories, even under certain conditions and limitations, is only acceptable when 
the visa regime for ordinary citizens is substantially facilitated. 
The Civil Society Forum remains committed to closely following developments in the 
process of visa facilitation and liberalization between the EU and Russia and intends to continue 
providing constructive policy recommendations and advocate for further progress in this area for 
the benefit of the public. 
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Executive summary 
On the occasion of the May 2003 Saint Petersburg EU-Russia Summit, the EU and Russia agreed to 
examine the conditions for visa-free travel as a “long-term perspective”. Ten years later, 
preparations for the introduction of a visa-free regime still continue within the context of the EU-
Russia visa dialogue. The most important outcome of this dialogue is the adoption of ‘Common 
Steps towards visa free short travel of Russian and EU citizens’ in December 2011. The Common 
Steps, which were released to the public only in March 2013, include a list of actions to be 
implemented by Russia and the EU in preparation of negotiations for the conclusion of a visa 
waiver agreement providing for the abolition of the visa requirement for holders of biometric 
passports and limited to short-term travels (stays of maximum 90 days in every 180 day period).  
In anticipation of the start of negotiations on such an EU-Russia visa waiver agreement, both 
partners aim at the further facilitation of the existing visa regime. A ‘first generation’ visa 
facilitation agreement (VFA) entered into force in 2007, in parallel with an agreement on 
readmission. An upgrade of the VFA in order to further simplify visa requirements for short-term 
travels is currently on top of the agenda of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership and is one of the 
(many) obstacles on the bumpy road towards visa free travel in the future.  
Despite the flexibilities offered within the context of the Schengen acquis, Russian 
legislation and the EU-Russia VFA, travelling between Russia and the EU remains a complex 
exercise. Based upon an analysis of existing practice, a number of remaining challenges can be 
identified. First, the use of harmonized lists of documents and procedures could be further 
improved in order to ensure the equal treatment of all visa applicants. It is argued that an effective 
facilitation of the entire application procedure requires a more efficient use of electronic means of 
communication. Second, the EU Member States and Russia increasingly rely on external service 
providers which de facto increases the cost of the visa application procedure and entails risks for the 
equal treatment of visa applicants. Hence, it is of crucial importance that the staff working at visa 
centers is well-trained and aware of the sometimes subtle interpretations of the EU-Russia VFA and 
relevant national legislation. Third, multiple-entry visas with a long term of validity (up to 5 years) 
are rarely used under the existing visa arrangements. Yet, the more flexible use of such multiple 
entry visas could significantly facilitate the life of frequent travelers, on the one hand, and limit the 
workload of consulates and visa centers, on the other hand. Fourth, visa applicants are often 
unaware about their rights or the options to benefit from a facilitated regime, including the 
possibility to apply for a multiple entry visa. Moreover, notwithstanding the existence of a formal 
right of appeal against visa application refusals, it appears very difficult in practice to launch such a 
procedure due to a number of practical obstacles such as lack of information, language barriers etc. 
Hence, there is a need to even better inform visa applicants about their rights and to provide 
alternative methods to ensure that these rights are respected in practice.  
With regard to the process of visa liberalization, there is a clear discrepancy in the position 
of the Russian Federation and the European Union concerning the interpretation of the Common 
Steps, in particular as far as the fourth block on ‘external relations’ is concerned. Whereas from a 
Russian perspective, the latter block is more political in nature and, therefore, considered of less 
importance in comparison to the technical preparations for introducing the visa free regime as 
defined within the other three blocks, considerations such as respect for fundamental rights and 
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freedoms are crucial concern for many EU Member States and representatives within the EU 
institutions. It is argued in this report that only the use of clearly defined benchmarks, essentially 
focusing on the management of migration flows and security, can make the introduction of a visa 
free regime for short-term travel a realistic perspective. 
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Introduction 
Already at the 1990 Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE), the participating states promised to strive for efficient visa application procedures 
and reduced visa fees to ensure freer movement of persons.3 Questions about movement of persons 
gained particular importance in the context of the EU’s eastward enlargement policy, which started 
after the 1993 Copenhagen meeting of the European Council.4 As part of their preparations for 
membership, the candidate countries were required to adopt and implement all EU legislation (the 
so-called acquis communautaire), including the EU’s Schengen rules on external border controls 
and common visa requirements for nationals of non-EU Member States.5 This had significant 
consequences for Russia as a number of agreements on simplified border crossing had to be 
annulled.6 For instance, it implied that residents of Russia’s Kaliningrad region – cut from Russian 
mainland by the territory of new EU Member States – lost their right of visa-free travel through the 
territory of Lithuania. It is in this context that Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a proposal 
in August 2002 to reciprocally abolish the visa requirement between Russia and the EU.7  
In its Communication on the Kaliningrad transit problem, the European Commission 
referred to this Russian initiative rather positively, noting “with interest the Russian proposal to 
open discussions on defining the conditions necessary for the eventual establishment of a visa-free 
travel regime”.8 Nevertheless, the Commission also referred to existing technical and political 
obstacles related to the introduction of a visa free regime, such as questions of passport security and 
migration control. Specially, it was observed that “before the EU and Russia are able to identify 
and carry out the measures needed to set the conditions for abolishing the visa regime, co-operation 
on crime and illegal migration should be stepped up immediately, including preparation of a 
readmission agreement.” Therefore, the main conclusion was that “it would be premature at this 
stage to foresee a specific timetable for the abolition of the visa requirement.”9 
Even though the 2002 Putin proposal did not yield any immediate results, it nevertheless 
opened the gates to more profound discussions on enhanced cooperation in the field of Justice and 
Home Affairs. This resulted in a compromise on facilitated transit to Kaliningrad10 and in the formal 
                                                            
3 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304.  
4 On the EU’s eastward enlargement and its implications for Russia, see e.g. P. Van Elsuwege, From Soviet Republics to 
EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the Baltic States’ Accession to the EU, Boston-Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, pp. 399-462.   
5 A recent example is the introduction of a visa regime between Russia and Croatia on 1 April 2013 as part of Croatia’s 
preparations for accession to the EU, which took effect on 1 July 2013. See: Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs, ‘Visa requirements overview’, at: http://www.mvep.hr/en/consular-information/visas/visa-
requirements-overview/.   
6 See: O. Potemkina, ‘Some Ramifications of Enlargement on the EU-Russia Relations and the Schengen Regime’, 
European Journal of Migration and Law 5 (2003), 229-247.   
7 ! "#$%&'()* +,-.(/-'0& 1#$$(( 2.2.+30('& +,-/$-/&0-%4 5#6($$(( 78,#"-9$:(* $##;<-$08 ( =%&8&6 
=#$3/&,$08->%-'#8 78,#$#4.& [On communications of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the 
President of the European Communities and to the Heads of State of the European Union Member States], available at 
the official website of the Russian MFA: 
http://www.mid.ru/bl.nsf/4d6cf8cbe426a71743256918006895e7/ef66e4aefcfa887b43256c23002de579?OpenDocument  
8 COM (2002) Communication from the Commission to the Council “Kaliningrad: Transit”, COM (2002) 510 final, 
Brussels, 18.09.2002. 
9 Ibid.  
10 P. Van Elsuwege, From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the Baltic States’ 
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recognition that visa-free travel is a ‘long-term objective’ of EU-Russia co-operation.11 In the short 
term, the aim was to facilitate the visa application procedures as much as possible. In this respect, 
the EU and Russia launched negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement (VFA), which entered into 
force in 2007, in parallel with an agreement on readmission.12 This parallelism between facilitation 
of the visa procedures, on the one hand, and a legally binding framework for readmission of 
irregular migrants, on the other hand, is no coincidence. Already in a Joint Declaration to the EU-
Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 1994, it was recognized that 
progress in facilitating the administrative procedures for the issuing of visas and residence permits 
to businessmen depended on the timely conclusion of readmission agreements between Russia and 
the EU Member States.13  
In contrast to the EU, Russia was eager to abolish the visa regime at the time of the 
negotiations for a readmission agreement. As a compromise formula, the road map for the 
establishment of a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, adopted on the occasion of the 
2005 Moscow EU-Russia summit, refers to the short term objectives of visa facilitation and 
readmission, on the one hand, and to the long-term objective of full visa liberalization, on the other 
hand. In order to achieve the latter objective, a visa dialogue, co-chaired by Russia’s MFA Special 
Representative, Anwar Azimov, and European Commission Director-General for Home Affairs, 
Stefano Manservisi, started its work in 2007.   
At the June 2010 EU-Russia Summit in Rostov, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
proposed to his EU partners a draft agreement on mutual visa waiver.14 This unexpected move of 
the Russian diplomacy was not welcomed by the EU side that continued to insist on gradual 
rapprochement in the framework of the visa dialogue. Nevertheless, this situation contributed to an 
intensification of the discussions on visa liberalization with the most important outcome being the 
adoption of a list of ‘Common Steps towards Visa-Free Short Travel of Russian and EU Citizens’ 
on the occasion of the December 2011 EU-Russia summit.15 For more than a year, this document 
was not open for the general public. The release of the Common Steps in March 2013 gave some 
hope for further progress in the visa dialogue.  
The ‘Common Steps’ are not included in a legally binding document but rather provide a 
policy framework setting out a common methodology and an enumeration of measures to be 
implemented with regard to four ‘blocks’ of issues:  (i) document security, including biometrics, (ii) 
illegal immigration, including readmission, (iii) public order and security; (iv) external relations. It 
aims to prepare the start of negotiations on a visa waiver agreement abolishing the visa requirement 
for holders of biometric passports. There is no official target date nor does the full implementation 
of the Common Steps automatically lead to the start of such negotiations. At the EU side, this will 
require a formal Council decision in accordance with the provisions of Article 218 TFEU (cf. infra).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Accession to the EU, Boston-Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, pp. 335-345; H. Burkhart, Integrated Border Management 
on the Russian-EU Border: the Kaliningrad Pilot. East-West Institute Policy Brief, 2005, Brussels. 
11 Joint Statement 2003 EU-Russia Summit Saint Petersburg, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/75969.pdf.  
12 Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas 
to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation, OJ (2007) L 129/27; Agreement between the 
European Community and the Russian Federation on readmission, OJ (2007) L 129/40. 
13 Joint Declaration in relation to Articles 26, 32 and 37 of the EC-Russia PCA, OJ (1997) L 327/3.   
14 News Conference following EU-Russia Summit, 1 June 2010,  http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/322  
15 For the text of the Common Steps, see: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-
affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf  
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While the preparations for the introduction of a visa-free regime for short-term travel 
continue within the context of the EU-Russia visa dialogue and are discussed on a regular basis 
within the Permanent Partnership Council on Freedom, Security and Justice and at the EU-Russia 
Summits, there is a commitment to further simplify visa requirements for short-term travels. In this 
respect, both partners aim at the conclusion of an updated visa facilitation agreement. Hence, the 
processes of visa liberalization and facilitation are both to be considered as self-standing and 
reciprocal processes, which proceed in parallel. Of course, there is a certain connection between the 
two in the sense that the effective implementation of the (updated) visa facilitation agreement is 
considered by the partners as a precondition for progress towards further visa liberalization.16 
However, it is only one element in a much more complex process ultimately leading to the final 
objective of visa free short term travel in the future.  
Discussions about further visa facilitation and liberalization cannot be disconnected from the 
general context of EU-Russia relations. It is no secret that the EU and Russia have different 
perceptions on a number of outstanding issues, including inter alia the scope of a new bilateral 
framework agreement, the implications of the EU’s competition rules for EU-Russia energy 
cooperation and the existence of competing neighborhood strategies.17 Of outmost importance for 
the visa discussion are certainly the different visions on the interpretation of fundamental values 
such as respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, this ‘value’ dimension has been given a more prominent place in the EU’s legal 
order as well as in its external action.18 This is also illustrated in the relations between the EU and 
Russia. The European Parliament’s strong condemnation of the irregularities in the preparation and 
conduct of the latest Russian parliamentary and presidential elections;19 the open letter of European 
Council President Herman Van Rompuy criticizing the state of the rule of law and judiciary in the 
Russian Federation in the context of the Magnitsky case;20 the strong public statement of the EU’s 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton in support of the ‘Pussy Riot’ punk band 
members21 as well as the most recent European Parliament resolutions and debates on the state of 
affairs in Russia following the adoption of legislation on the registration of NGOs and the banning 
of ‘homosexual propaganda’22 all illustrate that ‘values’ are at the core of contemporary relations 
between the EU and Russia. This is particularly the case because the European Parliament, which is 
traditionally more sensitive to human rights issues, has become a more active actor in the EU’s 
                                                            
16 This is evident from the text of the Common Steps: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf  
17 For a general discussion on the challenges in contemporary EU-Russia relations, see:  Van Elsuwege P. (2012), 
‘Towards a Modernisation of EU-Russia Legal Relations’, CEURUS EU-Russia Papers No 5, available at: 
http://ceurus.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/EU-Russia-Paper-51.pdf and Casier, T. (2013) ‘The European Union 
and Russia: partners by default?’, in: Cierco, T. (ed.) The European Union Neighbourhood: Challenges and 
Opportunities. Farnham: Ashgate. pp. 123-141. 
18 For comments, see e.g. E. Herlinn-Karnell, ‘EU Values and the Shaping of the International Legal Context’, in: D. 
Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. 
19 European Parliament (2012), Resolution of 15 March 2012 on the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia, 
P7_TA(2012)0088. 
20 A Rettman (2012), EU President: Magnitsky case is ‘emblematic’ for Russia, at: 
http://euobserver.com/magnitsky/115968.  
21 Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the sentencing of ‘Pussy Riot’ punk band members in 
Russia, 17 August 2012, A 370/12, at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132192.pdf.    
22 European Parliament Resolution of 13 June 2013 on the rule of law in Russia, P7_TA(2013)0284. 
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external action. This also has direct implications for EU-Russia visa relations as the European 
Parliament will have to give its consent to the conclusion of international agreements leading to 
further visa facilitation and, ultimately, visa waiver.23 Moreover, Russia’s complicated bilateral 
relationship with certain EU Member States24 as well as widespread fears within the Union that an 
abolishment of the visa requirement  will increase migratory pressure and organized crime implies 
that delivering on the ‘long-term’ promise of visa free travel is not evident.25  
In what follows, a more detailed analysis of the parallel yet distinctive processes of visa 
facilitation and liberalization is offered. After clarifying the legal framework of the EU-Russia visa 
regime (I), specific attention is devoted to the practice of EU-Russia visa relations (II) and the 
prospects of a visa free regime in the future (III). Based upon this analysis and including a reference 
to ‘best practices’, a number of policy recommendations are formulated (IV). 
                                                            
23 This is a direct result of the procedure for concluding international agreements as laid down in Article 218 TFEU (cf. 
infra). 
24 For instance, on intricate and often ambiguous relationships between Central European countries and Russia see 
Dangerfield, M. (2012) ‘Visegrad Group Cooperation and Russia’, Journal of Common Market Studies , Vol.50, No.6. 
Pp. 958-974. For a detailed overview of all EU Member States’ positions vis-à-vis Russia see David, M., Gower, J. and 
Haukkala, H. (2013) National Perspectives on Russia. European Foreign Policy in the Making? Abingdon: Routledge. 
298p; Lobjakas, A., Mölder, M. (eds.) (2012), EU-Russia Watch 2012, University of Tartu, Centre for EU-Russia 
Studies (CEURUS), available at: http://ceurus.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/EU-Russia-watch_1-20121.pdf.   
25 See also: M.M. Salminen, A. Moshes, Practice what you preach. The prospects for visa freedom in Russia-EU 
relations, FIIA Report, 2009 at: http://www.fiia.fi/assets/events/FIIA_Report_18_2009.pdf.  
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Part I The Legal Framework of the EU-Russia Visa Regime 
1. Relevant EU legislation 
Pursuant to Article 77 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU has 
the competence to develop a common policy on visas and other short-stay residence permits.26 This 
is a direct and logical consequence of the Schengen rules, which essentially provide for the 
abolition of internal border controls between the participating Member States together with a 
common external border management.27  
The EU’s common visa policy is essentially based on three legal instruments. First, 
Regulation 539/2001 defines the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.28 
Russia is one of the countries figuring on the so-called ‘black list’ of countries whose nationals are 
under a visa requirement to enter the territory of the EU. Second, Regulation 1683/95 lays down a 
uniform format for visas including technical specifications of the Schengen visa sticker and a 
procedure to adopt supplementary measures against counterfeiting and falsification of the visa.29 
Third, Regulation No 810/2009 establishing the EU visa code sets out all procedures and conditions 
for issuing ‘short stay visas’, i.e. for intended stays in the territory of the Member States not 
exceeding three months in any six-month period, and for ‘airport transit visas’.30 The issuing of 
long-stay visas (beyond 90 days) falls outside the scope of application of the EU visa code. Such 
long-stay visas as well as residence permits are issued by the Member States on the basis of national 
legislation. Yet, holders of long-term visas or a residence permit from one of the Schengen 
countries are entitled to move freely within the Schengen area for a period of three months during 
any six-month period.31 
The EU visa code aims to ensure the equal treatment of all visa applicants through the 
harmonization of the application procedures.32 The Member State whose territory constitutes the 
sole or main destination of the visit is responsible for examining the visa application. If the main 
                                                            
26 It is noteworthy that before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the term short-term stay was defined as ‘for an 
intended stay of no longer than three months’. Such an explicit definition is no longer mentioned in the TFEU, which 
leads Steve Peers to the conclusion that “it is interesting to speculate whether, in practice, the EU might wish to offer to 
certain third countries, and/or to provide to certain categories of individuals, the issue of visas for more than three 
months or short-stay permits of a longer validity”. See: S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, p. 233. 
27 The Schengen rules, including a common borders code and a common visa policy for short-term stays, entered the EU 
framework with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. The Schengen area encompasses most EU Member States, except 
for Ireland and the United Kingdom (‘opt-out’), Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia (Schengen candidate 
countries). Four non-EU Member States (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) are part of the Schengen area. 
For more information on the background of the Schengen cooperation and the Schengen area; see: General Secretariat 
of the EU Council, Schengen. Your Gateway to Free Movement in Europe, Luxembourg, Publications Office, 2013.  
28 OJ (2001) L 81/1.  
29 OJ (1995) L 164/1. 
30 OJ (2009) L 243/1.  
31 Regulation (EU) No 265/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 March 2010 amending the 
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as regards movement of persons 
with a long-stay visa, OJ (2010) L 85/1.  
32 To ensure the uniform implementation of the EU visa code, the European Commission has adopted a Handbook for 
the processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas and a Handbook for the organization of visa 
sections and local Schengen cooperation. Both Handbooks include a set of operational instructions to be applied by the 
Member States’ relevant authorities.  
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destination cannot be determined, the Member State of first entry into the Union is competent.33 
Regulation 810/2009 lays down common rules on inter alia the required supporting documents, the 
visa fee, the maximum processing period of a visa request and the grounds for refusing a visa. Of 
particular significance are the provisions on the so-called ‘Local Schengen Cooperation’ (LSC) 
among Member States’ consulates and the European Commission.34 The aim of this cooperation is 
to guarantee a consistent implementation of the EU visa code, taking into account local 
circumstances. For this purpose, there is a regular exchange of information on the number of visas 
issued, refusal rates, the use of false, counterfeit or forged documents and other aspects necessary 
for the assessment of migratory and/or security risks. A concrete outcome of the LSC is the adoption 
of a harmonized list of supporting documents to be submitted by applicants for a Schengen visa in 
the Russian Federation35 together with an information sheet about the general rights and conditions 
related to a uniform Schengen visa.36 Both documents, in force since 14 January 2013, aim to ensure 
greater transparency and help to prevent visa shopping and the different treatment of visa 
applicants.  
2. Relevant Russian legislation 
The Russian Federal Law “on the Order of Departure from the Russian Federation and Entrance to 
the Russian Federation” lays down all basic information regarding the different types of visa and 
the conditions for the issuance of visas by Russian consular missions.37 A separate Government 
Regulation38 contains all information regarding the visa application procedure and forms, together 
with the above mentioned Federal Law, the counterpart of the EU visa code.  
Depending on the purpose of entrance of a foreign citizen to the Russian Federation and the 
purpose of his stay, a visa can either be diplomatic, service, ordinary, transit or for temporary 
residence. Ordinary visas are further subdivided in private, business, tourist, educational, working, 
humanitarian and entry visa for reception of a refugee. A special invitation from an inviting party in 
Russia (company, organization, tourist agency, private person) is required to obtain a Russian visa 
together with guarantees of financial, medical and residential security for the period of the 
foreigners’ stay in the Russian Federation. The invitation should contain detailed information 
regarding the invited person, the purpose of his trip, the period of stay and the intended places of 
visit in the Russian Federation.  
Russian law39 requires foreign visitors to register their Russian visas with the Federal 
Migration Service. Before amendments in the legislation, which came into effect on 20 March 
                                                            
33 Article 5 of the EU visa code.  
34 See Title V of the EU visa code. 
35 The list is available at:  
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/visa_harmlist_docs_en.pdf.  
36 This information sheet is available at:  
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/visa_gen_info_en.pdf.  
37 ?-/-,&%@'A9 .&:#' #0 15.08.1996 N 114-?B «! "#,)/:- 8A-./& (. 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C(( ( 8D-./& 8 
1#$$(9$:34 ?-/-,&C(4», "E#;,&'(- .&:#'#/&0-%@$08& 1?", 19.08.1996, N 34, $0. 4029. 
38 +#$0&'#8%-'(- +,&8(0-%@$08& 1? #0 9 (4') 2003 =.  F 335 «!; 308-,G/-'(( +#%#G-'() #; 3$0&'#8%-'(( 
H#,6A 8(.A, "#,)/:& ( 3$%#8(9 -- #H#,6%-'() ( 8A/&>(, ",#/%-'() $,#:& -- /-9$08(), 8#$$0&'#8%-'() -- 8 
$%3>&- 30,&0A, & 0&:G- "#,)/:& &''3%(,#8&'() 8(.A», !"#$%&'( )%*"&"+%,(-./,0% 12, 16.06.2003, 3 24, 
/,.2329. English language version available at: http://en.russia.edu.ru/information/npb/fzakon/post/335/index/.  
39 ?-/-,&%@'A9 .&:#' #0 18.07.2006 N 109-?B "! 6(=,&C(#''#6 3>-0- ('#$0,&''A* =,&G/&' ( %(C ;-. 
=,&G/&'$08& 8 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C((", "E#;,&'(- .&:#'#/&0-%@$08& 1?", 24.07.2006, N 30, $0. 3285. 
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201140 all foreigners had to be registered within 3 working days and then the migration service had 
to be notified of their departure within the same period. Due to the amendments, the last 
requirement is abolished and the period within which foreigners must be registered is extended to 7 
working days. Registration can be carried out by the hotel where a foreigner is staying or by the 
company/organization/individual which issued the visa invitation.  
In principle, all foreign citizens and stateless persons need a visa for entry and exit from the 
territory of the Russian Federation. However, exceptions to this basic rule can be established either 
by federal law, presidential decree or international agreements. Abolishment of the visa requirement 
through a federal law or presidential decree is normally used in the context of sport or political 
events and is applicable for a limited period of time.41 A special visa free regime has also been 
introduced according to a presidential decree for the stateless persons, living in Latvia and Estonia, 
who had the citizenship of the USSR.42 In all other cases, visa liberalization in Russia is based on 
international agreements concluded on a reciprocal basis.43 Accordingly, Russia established a visa 
free regime with several countries.44 In addition, international agreements on the facilitation of the 
existing visa regime have been concluded with the EU (cf. infra) and, separately, with members of 
the Schengen area which are not covered by this agreement (Denmark, Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland).45 More recently, Russia established visa facilitation agreements 
(VFAs) with other developed countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States 
of America (USA). 
Before analyzing in more detail the EU-Russia VFA, it is noteworthy that this agreement 
does not apply to the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland because those countries are not part of the 
Schengen area. Moreover, they refused to sign similar agreements at a bilateral level.46 For the EU 
                                                            
40 ?-/-,&%@'A9 .&:#' 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C(( #0 20 6&,0& 2011 =. N 42-?B "! 8'-$-'(( (.6-'-'(9 8 ?-/-,&%@'A9 
.&:#' "! 6(=,&C(#''#6 3>-0- ('#$0,&''A* =,&G/&' ( %(C ;-. =,&G/&'$08& 8 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C((" ( 
#0/-%@'A- .&:#'#/&0-%@'A- &:0A 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C((" http://www.rg.ru/2011/03/23/migranty-site-dok.html 
41 See I:&. +,-.(/-'0& 1? #0 08.05.2013 N 484 "! "#,)/:- 8D-./& 8 1#$$(9$:34 ?-/-,&C(4 ( 8A-./& (. 
1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C(( ('#$0,&''A* =,&G/&' ( %(C ;-. =,&G/&'$08& 8 $8).( $ ",#8-/-'(-6 6-G/3'&,#/'A* 
$"#,0(8'A* $#,-8'#8&'(9", "E#;,&'(- .&:#'#/&0-%@$08& 1?", 13.05.2013, N 19, $0. 2381. I:&. +,-.(/-'0& 1? #0 
05.06.2012 N 777 "! "#,)/:- 8D-./& 8 1#$$(9$:34 ?-/-,&C(4 ( 8A-./& (. 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C(( ('#$0,&''A* 
=,&G/&' - 8%&/-%@C-8 :&,0 /%) /-%#8A* ( $%3G-;'A* "#-./#: 8 $0,&'A - 3>&$0'(CA H#,36& "J.(&0$:#-
0(*##:-&'$:#- K:#'#6(>-$:#- $#0,3/'(>-$08#", "E#;,&'(- .&:#'#/&0-%@$08& 1?", 11.06.2012, N 24, $0. 3136.  
42 I:&. +,-.(/-'0& 1? #0 17.06.2008 N 977 "! "#,)/:- 8D-./& 8 1#$$(9$:34 ?-/-,&C(4 ( 8A-./& (. 1#$$(9$:#9 
?-/-,&C(( %(C ;-. =,&G/&'$08&, $#$0#)8L(* 8 =,&G/&'$08- EEE1 ( ",#G(8&4<(* 8 M&08(9$:#9 1-$"3;%(:- (%( 
N$0#'$:#9 1-$"3;%(:-" "E#;,&'(- .&:#'#/&0-%@$08& 1?", 23.06.2008, N 25, $0. 2959. 
43 According to Article 15 1 (a) of the Federal Law on International agreements, the ratification procedure is obligatory 
for international agreements on visa liberalization. See: ?-/-,&%@'A9 .&:#' #0 15.07.1995 N 101-?B "! 
6-G/3'&,#/'A* /#=#8#,&* 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C((", "E#;,&'(- .&:#'#/&0-%@$08& 1?", 17.07.1995, N 29, $0. 2757. 
44 A distinction can be made between countries whose citizens can be admitted on the basis of a domestic Identity Card 
(civic passport) and countries whose citizens can be admitted on the basis of a valid international passport. The first 
group includes Russia’s closest allies within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Belarus (no border 
control exists due to the Union State of Russia and Belarus), Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and several 
states with limited recognition: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria. The second group  includes other CIS countries 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Moldova) as well as most of Latin American countries, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, 
Israel, some countries of South-East Asia and Africa and special administrative regions of China – Hong Kong and 
Macau.   
45 Such separate agreements were necessary with Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland because those 
Schengen countries are not EU Member States and with Denmark as this EU Member State is not covered under the 
EU-Russia VFA due to its separate status within the Schengen regime under Protocol No 22 to the Treaty on European 
Union.  
46 However, in the UK, there is an opportunity to use the ‘transit without visa’ concession if a citizen needs to transit 
through the territory of the UK and has to travel between different airports or even cities to do so. In order to qualify for 
this regime one must arrive and depart by air and the onward flight must be confirmed and must depart within 24 hours; 
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Member States that do not yet fully apply the Schengen acquis after their accession to the EU 
(Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Cyprus), a protocol to the EU-Russia VFA provides that those 
countries can only issue national visas the validity of which is limited to their own territory.47 
Significantly, a special facilitated regime applies in the context of Russia’s relations with Cyprus: 
Russian citizens only need to apply online for a so-called e-ProVisa on the website of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of this Republic, and usually it is granted within 24 hours and printed out by the 
applicant to show at the border.48 A ProVisa is valid for a direct single-entry trip from Russia to the 
Republic of Cyprus, for a maximum duration of ninety days within a six-month period. In this case 
the basic rule of reciprocity does not apply as Cypriot citizens need to go through a formal visa 
application procedure for visits to Russia.49    
3. The EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement 
The visa facilitation agreement (VFA) between the European Community (now European Union) 
and the Russian Federation entered into force on 1 June 2007. It was the first VFA ever negotiated 
between the EU and a third country. The essential aim of the agreement is to facilitate the issuance 
of short-stay visas to the citizens of both parties on the basis of reciprocity.50 The VFA introduces a 
list of ‘privileged categories’ of citizens51 that can obtain a visa with fewer documents against a 
reduced or even waived visa fee52 and within a shorter period of time than allowed under the EU 
visa code and the relevant Russian legislation.53 The VFA also provides that the diplomatic missions 
and consular posts of the Member States and the Russian Federation shall issue multiple-entry visas 
with a term of validity ranging between one to five years to the defined categories of privileged 
citizens.54  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
finally, one must have proper documentation for the destination, including a visa if required. See: 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/visas-immigration/transitthroughtheuk/visa-to-transit-landside/.  
47 OJ (2007) L 129/35.  
48 The required application form is available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/moscowembassy.nsf/all/31d36e30c855de72c225759800292a92?OpenDocument
=&highlight=pro+visa/  
49 Also in its relations with Georgia, Russia does not apply the reciprocity principle. Georgia unilaterally abolished the 
visa regime for Russian citizens on 29 January 2012 but according to the official Russian position the visa regime for 
Georgians in Russia can only be abolished after the restoration of diplomatic relations which were halted following the 
outbreak of violence in the breakaway regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. 
50 On the EU side, however, the agreement does not apply with regard to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark as 
a result of those countries’ special status under the Schengen regime.    
51 The following categories are mentioned: (i) members of official delegations participating in meetings, consultations, 
negotiations or exchange programs; (ii) business people and representatives of business organizations; (iii) drivers 
conducting international cargo and passenger transportation services; (iv) members of train, refrigerator and locomotive 
crews in international trains; (v) journalists, (vi) persons participating in scientific, cultural and artistic activities; (vii) 
pupils, students, post-graduate students and accompanying teachers participating in educational training or exchange 
programs; (viii) participants in international sports events and their accompanying persons, (ix) participants in official 
exchange programs organized by twin cities; (x) close relatives and (xi) persons traveling for the purpose of visiting 
military or civil burial grounds. 
52 VFA, Art. 6. The standard price is 35 O under the regular procedure of 10 calendar days and O 70 for processing 
visas when the application and the supporting documents have been submitted within three days before the date of 
departure. Fees for processing the visa application are waived for certain categories of persons, including close 
relatives, members of official or parliamentary delegations, students, disabled persons, humanitarian aid workers, 
participants in youth international sport events and persons participating in scientific, cultural and artistic activities. 
53 The EU visa code foresees a standard visa fee of O 60 and a decision within 15 calendar days (see arts 16 and 23 of 
the EU visa code).  
54 Art. 5 of the VFA.  
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Negotiations on an upgraded version of the VFA, still ongoing at the time of writing of this 
contribution, aim to extend the categories of beneficiaries of visa facilitations amongst others to 
representatives of civil society organizations and a broader spectrum of family members. Under the 
new regime, wider groups of visa applicants will be able to benefit from visa fee waivers and will 
get easier access to long-term multiple entry visa of longer duration.55 A similar upgrade of the visa 
facilitation regime was recently agreed with Ukraine and entered into force on 1 July 2013.56 
Unfortunately, no final agreement on upgrading the VFA with Russia could be achieved on the 
occasion of the 3-4 June 2013 Yekaterinburg EU-Russia Summit due to different perspectives on 
the granting of a visa exemption to holders of service passports. Under the 2007 VFA only holders 
of valid diplomatic passports have a right to visa-free travel.57 Extending this privilege to service 
passport holders, an explicit Russian demand, is for the EU difficult to accept. According to the 
European Commission, such passports are widespread in Russian public administration and, 
therefore, difficult to control. Hence, the EU is reluctant to offer a carte blanche on this issue and 
insists that only a limited number of holders of valid biometric service passports can be exempted 
from the visa requirement. Again, the upgraded VFA with Ukraine may serve as an example. Also 
in this case, the extension of a right to visa free travel to service passport holders was granted under 
strict conditions. It is, for instance, noteworthy that an EU declaration to the amended agreement 
explicitly provides for a possibility to partly suspend the agreement if the implementation of the 
provision on service passport holders “is abused by Ukraine or leads to a threat to public security”.58  
It is regrettable that the amendment of the 2007 EU-Russia VFA is blocked due to different 
perspectives on service passports. As a result, ordinary citizens are prevented to benefit from an 
upgraded visa facilitation regime.59 Taking into account the importance of facilitated travel, and as 
an intermediary step towards full visa liberalization (cf. infra), the conclusion of an amended VFA 
is a short-term priority for EU-Russia relations. From the EU side, this will require not only the 
agreement of the Council (by qualified majority voting) but also the consent of the European 
Parliament (by ordinary majority). Against the background of the June 2013 Yekaterinburg EU-
Russia Summit, a group of 47 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) already announced that 
they would veto the amended VFA unless the EU implements sanctions against Russian officials 
involved in the Sergei Magnitsky case.60  Hence, there is a risk that the entire process of further visa 
facilitation is put on hold as a result of the linkage between discussions surrounding service 
passports and concerns about the state of the rule of law in Russia 
4. Local Border Traffic and Kaliningrad Transit 
As part of the EU Schengen acquis, a Local Border Traffic (LBT) regime has been established for 
border residents who frequently need to cross the external borders of the Union.61 Accordingly, EU 
                                                            
55 EU-Russia Summit, Yekaterinburg, 3-4 June 2013, MEMO/13/485, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-485_en.htm.  
56 Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine amending the Agreement between the European Community 
and Ukraine on the facilitation on the issuance of visas, OJ (2013) L 168/11.   
57 Art. 11 VFA.  
58 EU Declaration on Article 10 (2) of the amended VFA with Ukraine.  
59 See: http://visa-free-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CSF_visa_policy_brief_April_2013_eng.pdf.   
60 European Parliamentarians Plan to Veto EU-Russia Agreement on Visa-free Travel for Russian Officials unless EU 
Implements Magnitsky sanctions, http://lawandorderinrussia.org/2013/european-parliamentarians-plan-to-veto-eu-
russia-agreement-on-visa-free-travel-for-russian-officials-unless-eu-implements-magnitsky-sanctions/.  
61 Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 laying down 
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Member States can conclude bilateral agreements with their neighboring non-EU countries allowing 
for simplified border crossings for residents living, in principle, no more than 30 km or 
exceptionally 50 km from the border. Persons living within this area and which are not considered 
to be a threat to the public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of 
any of the Member States qualify for a LBT permit, which is valid for a minimum of one year and a 
maximum of five years.62 In comparison to the facilities offered under the VFA, the LBT regime 
offers significant additional advantages. For instance, applicants do not have to prove sufficient 
means of subsistence, the LBT permit may be issued free of charge and specific border crossing 
points can be set up to ensure the smooth movement of persons. Moreover, all bona fide border 
residents can benefit from this regime whereas the VFA only applies to specific categories of 
persons (cf. supra).  
Russia has LBT agreements with Poland,63 Norway64 and Latvia65 and a LBT is considered in 
relation to Lithuania. Of particular significance is the Russian-Polish LBT agreement of 14 
December 2011 covering the whole area of the Kaliningrad region and a corresponding territory on 
the Polish side including cities such as Olsztyn, Elblag and Gdansk.66 As this territorial area goes 
beyond the standard 30 km on both sides of the border it required a prior amendment of the EU’s 
LBT regulation.67 This elegant solution avoided a situation where the Kaliningrad region would be 
divided into three main parts, including separate visa free local border regimes with Lithuania and 
Poland in the north and in the south respectively and with a central part falling outside any LBT 
regime.  
The importance of the LBT regime between Russia and Poland should not be 
underestimated. Apart from the expected economic and social benefits of increased cross-border 
movement, it also illustrates how the relevant actors (Russia, the EU Member States and EU 
institutions) can overcome existing legal and political obstacles. Even though the effective 
implementation of the LBT regime is formally disconnected from the process of visa liberalization 
between Russia and the EU,68 it may be regarded as a ‘confidence building measure’ between the 
partners. Moreover, it opens the gates to further initiatives such as the establishment of joint border 
crossing points. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the 
Schengen Convention, OJ (2006) L 405/1.  
62 Art. 9-10 of Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006.  
63 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on the 
Rules of Local Border Traffic, available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/630c9ccb-acd7-45e5-89bf-8f9e529a3b05 
64 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation on 
Facilitation of Mutual Travel for Border Residents of the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation, 
[K%-:0,#''A9 ,-$3,$] http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/JD/Vedlegg/Grenseboeravtale_ENG.pdf.  
65 "E#=%&L-'(- 6-G/3 +,&8(0-%@$08#6 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C(( ( +,&8(0-%@$08#6 M&08(9$:#9 1-$"3;%(:( #; 
3",#<-'(( 8.&(6'A* "#-./#: G(0-%-9 ",(=,&'(>'A* 0-,,(0#,(9 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C(( ( M&08(9$:#9 
1-$"3;%(:(" (.&:%4>-'# 8 =. P#$:8- 20.12.2010). E#=%&L-'(- ,&0(H(C(,#8&'# ?-/-,&%@'A6 .&:#'#6 #0 
28.02.2012 N 13-?B, "E#;,&'(- .&:#'#/&0-%@$08& 1?", 05.03.2012, N 10, $0. 1161. 
66 J. Fomina, “Local border traffic agreement for the Kaliningrad region: a success story of the Polish presidency and a 
trust-building exercise for Poland and Russia”, Batory Foundation, Policy Brief, December 2011, available at: 
http://www.batory.org.pl.   
67 Regulation (EU) # 1342|2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 as regards the inclusion of the Kaliningrad oblast and certain Polish administrative 
districts in the eligible border area, OJ (2011), L 347/41.  
68 The common steps towards visa free short travel between citizens of the EU and Russia do not include a single 
reference to the implementation of the local border traffic regime.  
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With regard to Kaliningrad, the inclusion in the LBT regime comes on top of the special 
rules for facilitated transit, which has been developed in the context of Lithuania’s accession to the 
EU. According to this mechanism the transit of Russian nationals between the Kaliningrad region 
and mainland Russia through Lithuanian territory is realized on the basis of a Facilitated Transit 
Document (FTD) and a Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD).69 Despite the general 
satisfaction with this transit regime,70 the travel time by train between Kaliningrad and Moscow has 
increased from 17 hours to 22-23 hours as a result of additional security border checks. Hence, a 
further reduction of the time for examination of the FTD/FRTD, e.g. through inspection controls 
during the train trip rather than at the border, would help to further improve the situation. Moreover, 
the facilitated transit regime could be extended to the territory of Latvia. The shortest direct train 
connection between Kaliningrad and Saint-Petersburg goes via Daugavpils (Latvia). This route was 
used before 2003 but due to its accession to the EU, Latvia established visa requirements for the 
railway transit from Kaliningrad to Saint-Petersburg. As a result, Russian passengers have to use 
another route via Belarus, which is much longer. 
 !
                                                            
69 Council Regulation (EC) No 693/2003 of 14 April 2003 establishing a specific Facilitated Transit Document (FTD), a 
Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and amending the Common Consular Instructions and the Common Manual, 
OJ (2003) L 99/1. 
70 Report from the Commission of 22 December 2006 on the functioning of the facilitated transit for persons between 
the Kaliningrad region and the rest of the Russian Federation COM (2006) 840. 
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Part II The EU-Russia Visa Regime in Practice: Challenges and 
Directions of Improvement 
Despite the flexibilities offered within the context of the Schengen acquis, Russian legislation and 
the EU-Russia VFA, travelling between Russia and the EU remains a complex exercise. The 
standard procedure requires an invitation letter, a special health insurance, a rather detailed itinerary 
and at least two visits to the consulate or visa handling center in order to get the necessary stamps.71 
Based upon an analysis of existing practice, a number of remaining challenges can be identified 
with regard to, respectively, the use of harmonized lists of documents and procedures (1), the role 
of external service providers (2), the issuance of multiple entry visa (3), and the rights of visa 
applicants (4).   
1. The use of harmonized lists of documents and procedures 
The recent adoption of a harmonized list of documents that are required from Russian visa 
applicants travelling to the EU72 is a very important step forward towards a more coherent and 
transparent EU visa policy. However, even a brief monitoring of the information presented on the 
EU Member States consular missions’ or visa centers’ websites shows that there are still 
considerable differences in practice. In many cases these requirements are not fully respected. For 
example, although according to the harmonized list of documents the travel insurance should cover 
only the “period of intended stay”,73 the consulates of Finland demand that the travel insurance 
covers “the whole period of the visa validity as well as all days of the intended stay”.74 In case of 
visas of longer validity this becomes unnecessarily expensive, a person applying for a 5-year visa 
should buy insurance for 2,5 years (they can stay for 90 days within each 180-days’ period).  
Moreover, requirements with regard to the format of particular documents may depend on 
Member States’ national legislation, making the actual application of the harmonized list of 
documents very varied from country to country. For example, people travelling for tourism or 
paying private visits need to present confirmation of accommodation which can be a letter of 
invitation. However, some countries accept just a copy of an email from the host or sponsor (e.g. 
Finland), other countries demand an officially certified invitation, the issuance of which may 
require up to 30 days (e.g. Poland) and involves the payment of a fee.75 
As the European Commission concluded at the end of 2012 “the legal framework for 
structured LSC has not yet delivered its full potential”.76 For instance, the role of EU delegations in 
monitoring the uniform implementation of the EU visa code among the Member State consulates 
could be further enhanced. Despite the existence of harmonized rules for the handling of short-term 
                                                            
71 For an overview of required documents to travel between Belgium and Russia, see:  <http://www.vhs-
belgium.com/visa-Requirements/>  and <http://belgiumvac-ru.com/requisitedocuments.aspx>.   
72 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/visa_harmlist_docs_en.pdf.  
73 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/visa_harmlist_docs_en.pdf 
74 „"#%($ /#%G-' "#:,A8&0@ 8-$@ "-,(#/ /-9$08() .&",&L(8&-6#9 8(.A ( 8$- "%&'(,3-6A- /'( ",-;A8&'()”, 
http://www.finland.org.ru/public/default.aspx?nodeid=36986&contentlan=15&culture=ru-RU. Such practices have also 
been reported by people applying to consulates of other EU Member States, even if such information is not provided on 
a given consulate’s website.  
75 Information achieved via Visa whistle-blower webpage maintained by the Visa-free Europe Coalition: http://visa-
free-europe.eu/about-us/visa-whistle-blower/. With regard to the Polish visa application requirements, see: 
http://bip.mazowieckie.pl/cmsws/page/?D;1144.  
76 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the functioning of Local Schengen 
Cooperation during the first two years of implementation of the Visa Code, COM (2012) 648 final.  
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visa applications within the Schengen area, it is no secret that in practice significant differences 
continue to exist. Some Member State consulates appear more ‘user friendly’ than others when 
implementing the common EU visa policy. For instance, Russians submitting applications to 
Finnish consulates are generally pleased with the level of service they obtain77 whereas consulates 
from certain other countries have the reputation to be rather strict.78    
The EU’s harmonized list of documents may serve as a good practice example for the 
Russian Federation as it includes a clear and transparent overview of required documentary 
evidence for different categories of applicants in line with the EU-Russia VFA. A further 
harmonization of the visa application procedures, not only among the EU Member States in the 
context of the LSC, but also between the EU and Russia would increase the predictability and 
legitimacy of the existing visa regime in the spirit of reciprocity. Moreover, closer EU-Russia visa 
cooperation including the exchange of best practices and common approaches would be helpful to 
increase the level of trust among the partners, which is a crucial precondition to proceed with the 
parallel process of visa liberalization (cf. infra).79 
Both the EU and Russia could work towards a better and harmonized use of electronic 
means of communication. Currently, some consulates or visa centers accept electronic or fax copies 
of invitations, while others insist on enclosing the originals at the point of submitting the visa 
application, which makes arranging a visit extremely time consuming and often leads to a situation 
where a visitor simply fails to attend an event due to the fact that the original of the invitation 
arrived too late by post. Another issue is submission of documents by a third person. Again there are 
considerable differences between different consulates and visa centers, with some insisting on the 
submission of documents in person, whereas others allowing third persons submit the documents on 
behalf of the applicant. 
In the twenty-first century, technological developments could be better used as part of the 
visa facilitation process between the EU and Russia. Several countries already introduced electronic 
visas (eVisas). The United Nations World Tourism Organization recommends the use of eVisas as a 
secure and efficient alternative to traditional paper visa: ”[i]t can be more easily obtained and 
requires neither the physical presence of the applicant nor the presence of the passport, which is 
especially important for destinations without a wide-spread network of embassies and consulates.”80 
The eVisa programs of Australia and the United States are generally regarded as good practice 
examples. Significantly, also within the EU there are examples of visa facilitation going beyond 
what is traditionally provided under a VFA. A concrete example is the specific e-Pro Visa 
mechanism used by Russian tourists visiting Cyprus (cf. supra). In the context of the European 
Football Championship held in Poland in June/July 2012, visas were issues according to a 
simplified procedure, without the obligation to appear in person at the consulate.81 It is our 
                                                            
77 M.M. Salminen, A. Moshes, Practice what you preach. The prospects for visa freedom in Russia-EU relations, FIIA 
Report, 2009, p. 30. 
78 Q#;,#8$:&) R. ( /,. 1-.3%@0&0A #",#$& $,-/( '-:#66-,>-$:(* #,=&'(.&C(9 8 ,&6:&* ",#-:0& NO-VISA. P.: 
2012. 
79 For an analysis of trust problems in EU-Russia relations, see: +#0-6:('&, !. (2011) “+,#;%-6& /#8-,() 1#$$(( ( 
7E 8 ,&6:&* #;<-=# ",#$0,&'$08& $8#;#/A, ;-.#"&$'#$0( ( ",&8#$3/()”.  78,#"-9$:(9 E#4. 8 XXI 8-:-: 8,-6) 
($"A0&'(9. +#/ ,-/. !.S. +#0T6:('#9 (#08.,-/.), U.S. 5&8-L'(:#8&, U.Q. 5#'/,&0@-8#9. P.: 2-$@ P(,. 
80 United Nations World Tourism Organization, “Visa Facilitation, Stimulating Economic Growth and Development 
Through Tourism”, available at: http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_visa_facilitation.pdf.  
81 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Implementation and development 
of the common visa policy to spur growth in the EU, COM (2012) 649 final Brussels,7 November 2012, p. 8.  
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conviction that only the introduction of an eVisa regime without the need to appear in person at the 
consulate constitutes a real facilitation of the procedure. In addition, the use of migration cards and 
the requirement of visa registration are time-consuming and may be abolished in light of 
technological developments.  
Technological innovations can also solve practical problems of border crossing. In this 
regard, the so-called ‘smart border package’ is of particular significance.82 In essence, this package 
consists of a Registered Traveler Program (RTP) and an Entry/Exit System (EES). The RTP will 
allow frequent travelers from third countries to enter the EU using simplified border checks such as 
automated gates. The EES will replace the traditional stamping of passports with a centralized 
storage system for entry and exit data of third county nationals admitted for short stays to the 
Schengen area, thus allowing for a more efficient tracking of illegal overstays. Notwithstanding 
evident concerns regarding the protection of personal data and the significant financial implications 
of such a scheme, initiatives such as the smart border package as well as the expanded use of 
electronic means of communication in the visa application procedure may help to ensure smooth 
travel between the EU and Russia while safeguarding the evident interests in security and migration 
management.  
Finally, in anticipation of further technological innovations, cooperation with regard to the 
processing of visa applications could be further enhanced. This practice already exists among some 
EU Member States. For example, the Consulate General of Finland in St. Petersburg issues visas to 
people travelling to Austria. Also in other countries such forms of cooperation are not uncommon: 
in Armenia, the consulate of Germany issues visas for Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and 
Sweden. However, there are no common visa application centers in Russia, such as, for example, in 
Moldova, where the Common Application Centre in Chisinau issues visas on behalf of 16 
EU/Schengen states.83  
2. The role of external service providers 
The EU Member States and Russia increasingly rely on external service providers/outsourcing staff 
(so-called ‘visa centers’) for handling visa applications. Whereas such co-operation increases the 
administrative capacity to deal with the growing number of visa applications, this practice de facto 
raises the cost of the entire procedure. On top of the regular visa fee, service providers may charge 
an additional service fee proportionate to the costs of the provided service.84 It is, therefore, 
important that visa applicants maintain an effective possibility to lodge applications directly at its 
diplomatic missions or consular posts as foreseen under the EU visa code.85 The introduction of an 
explicit provision that the external service fee shall not exceed 30 O and that the Member States 
“shall maintain the possibility for all applicants to lodge their applications directly at their 
consulates” in the updated EU-Ukraine VFA is a good practice example, which may be expected to 
be included in an the upgraded VFA with the Russian Federation as well (cf. infra).86 This 
                                                            
82 European Commission, ‘Smart borders: enhancing mobility and security’, IP/13/162, 28 February 2013.  
83 The official web-site of the Common Application Centre is available here: http://www.cac.md/index_en.html 
84 Article 17 of the EU visa code. Whereas the option of applying directly at the consulate is often formally offered, 
waiting times for an appointment at the consular office up to two or three months (e.g.  de facto undermine the real 
choice for the applicant.  
85 See consideration 15 of the preamble to the EU visa code. 
86 Art. 6 (c) paragraph 5 of the Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine amending the Agreement between 
the European Community and Ukraine on the facilitation on the issuance of visas, OJ (2013) L 168/11.   
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amendment is important from the perspective of reciprocity and legal certainty.  
The correct implementation of such a provision will be of crucial importance. Even if 
consulates officially provide for the possibility to apply directly via the consulate, in practice this is 
often almost impossible due to a lack of available time slots for submission of documents or even 
express discouragement to apply directly by the consular staff. Some EU Member States officially 
declare that their consular representations accept visa applications directly only in exceptional cases 
and that the vast majority of applications should be processed by visa centers. For example, the 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declared that their target is to have 80% of all visa 
applications processed by visa centers,87 which is clearly in violation of the EU visa code 
provisions. 
In order to ensure the equal treatment of all visa applications it is also of crucial importance 
that external service providers and consulates apply the same standards during the visa application 
procedure. Problems may arise regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the EU-Russia 
VFA, for instance regarding the visa fee waiver for certain categories of applicants.88 As the visa 
centers in principle operate only as intermediaries between the visa applicants and the relevant 
consulates, the staff may be banned from advising or providing help to the applicants, including 
providing information that a given applicant may apply for a long validity visa.89 Yet, in practice, 
applicants are sometimes discouraged by the visa centers’ staff from applying for longer-term 
visas.90 What is even more significant, the staff of at least some EU Member State visa centers is 
required to provide recommendations as to the type of a visa that should be issued in a given case. 
Although the final decision is always made by the consular staff, taking into account the workload, 
it is clear that in all too many cases the final decision is actually taken by the local visa centers’ 
staff, as the consuls simply do not have the time to verify their recommendations.91 Hence, it is of 
crucial importance that the staff working at visa centers is well-trained and aware of the sometimes 
subtle interpretations of the EU-Russia VFA and relevant national legislation.92 
 
                                                            
87 SiegieV, Paulina, “Wizy w mWtnej wodzie”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 09.07.2013, last visited 14.07.2013,  
http://wyborcza.pl/1,87648,14244934,Wizy_w_metnej_wodzie.html?as=2 
88 The head of a Spanish NGO taking part in a cultural exchange program with the Russian Federation had to pay O 120 
in the visa service center in Madrid, O 70 for using the express procedure and O 50 service fee. [Information from 
“German-Russian Exchange”, Saint Petersburg, http://www. http://obmen.org] Arguably, this practice is contrary to 
Art. 6 (3) of the EU-Russia VFA, which waives the visa fee for persons taking part in scientific, cultural and artistic 
activities. Moreover, the 50 O service fee is more than the standard O 35, which is deemed to be proportionate for the 
service provided (cf. infra). This example illustrates how an upgraded VFA (cf. supra), including an explicit reference 
to NGOs as well as an explicit maximum fee for the visa service may be helpful to solve existing problems.  
89 See, for instance, the website of the Polish visa center in Kaliningrad, which explicitly provides that:” PA 6#G-6 
",-/%#G(0@ 8&6 "#6#<@ 8# 8,-6) 8$-=# ",#C-$$& "#/&>( 8(.#8A* .&)8%-'(9, '# 6A '- 3"#%'#6#>-'A $#8-0#8&0@ 
(%( '&",&8%)0@ 2&$ 8 8A;#,- 8(.#8#9 :&0-=#,((”. See: http://www.vfsglobal.com/poland/kaliningrad/  
90 Interviews with visa applicants and information achieved via Visa whistle-blower webpage maintained by the Visa-
free Europe Coalition: http://visa-free-europe.eu/about-us/visa-whistle-blower/.  
91According to the Polish consul in Kaliningrad, about 1,500 applications are submitted daily to the visa centre. In order 
to process such a number of applications, the consul would need to examine 3 visa applications per minute for 8 hours a 
day, which clearly does not leave much space for thorough consideration of the recommendations by the visa centre 
staff. See SiegieV, Paulina, “Wizy w mWtnej wodzie”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 09.07.2013, last visited 14.07.2013,  
http://wyborcza.pl/1,87648,14244934,Wizy_w_metnej_wodzie.html?as=2. 
92 For instance, when “German-Russian Exchange” St. Petersburg organized a youth exchange program with partners 
from the Baltic countries, the Russian visa service centre in Tallinn refused to grant visas free of charge for participants 
in this event arguing that youth exchange programs are not explicitly mentioned in the VFA. The Russian visa service 
centre in Riga had no problems to grant a visa fee waiver for a participant to the same youth event but argued that the 
applicant of 22 years was too old to be considered a youth representative.  
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All too often visa centers are located in the same cities where consular missions are already 
present.93 As a result, an opportunity to increase the options for visa applicants is unfortunately 
missed. This is particularly regrettable in large countries, such as Russia, where citizens living far 
away from consulates have to undertake long journeys in order to submit their visa applications.94  
Furthermore, the cooperation with external service providers only partially helps to cut 
down the waiting periods. After all, each application still needs to be handled by consular staff, so 
the possible number of issued visas still depends on the number of consulates/consular staff that can 
make decisions with regard to the issuance of visas. Still all too often waiting times in visa centers 
are equally very long, especially during holiday seasons.95  
3. The use of multiple entry visas: challenges with regard to their issuance and usage  
One of the greatest facilitations of the EU Schengen visa regime is the possibility of issuing 
multiple-entry visas with a long term of validity, up to 5 years, to persons who fulfill two criteria: 
(i) prove their “integrity and reliability” (which includes lawful use of previous Schengen visas, 
sound economic situation as well as intention to leave the Schengen territory before expiry of the 
visa) and (ii) prove the need to travel to the EU frequently.96 A rather sophisticated mechanism for 
the issuance of multiple entry visa is also explicitly foreseen under Article 5 of the EU-Russia 
VFA.97 Diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Member States and the Russian Federation 
are under a legal obligation98 to issue multiple entry visas with a term of validity of up to five years 
for members of national and regional governments and parliaments, constitutional courts and 
supreme courts as well as for spouses and children (including adopted), who are under the age of 21 
or are dependent, visiting their family members legally residing in the territory of the other party. 
For these categories of persons, their professional status or their family relationship justify the use 
of such long-term multiple entry visa, valid for five years or limited to their term in office or term of 
legal residence for the family member. In addition, the VFA provides that multiple entry visa with a 
term of validity of up to one year shall be issued to citizens belonging to specific professional 
categories provided that during the previous year they had obtained at least one visa which was used 
in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations and that there are reasons for requesting a 
multiple-entry visa. Such citizens become eligible for a multiple entry visa with a validity from two 
up to five years if they proved to be bona fide users of their one year multiple entry visa and the 
reasons for requesting a multiple-entry visa are still valid.  
 
                                                            
93 A notable exception here is Spain, whose visa centers are present in 20 Russian cities. 
94 This is confirmed by an analysis of the problem of consular coverage in Mananashvili, S. (2013)  “Access to Europe 
in a Globalised World - Assessing EU’s Common Visa Policy in the light of the Stockholm Guidelines”, paper 
presented at the 2013 annual conference of the Migration Policy Centre (European University Institute), to be 
published. 
95 Interviews with visa applicants and information achieved via Visa whistle-blower webpage maintained by the Visa-
free Europe Coalition: http://visa-free-europe.eu/about-us/visa-whistle-blower/.  
96 Art. 24 of the EU Visa Code 
97 It is noteworthy that the visa facilitation agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America 
includes a much more straightforward mechanism of multiple-entry visa. According to the agreement, “nationals of 
each party shall as a rule (emphasis added) be issued multiple-entry visas for a stay of no more than 6 months starting 
from the date of each entry that are valid for 36 months from the date of issue.” See: 
http://moscow.usembassy.gov/new-visa-agreement.html.  
98 The wording of Article 5 of the EU-Russia VFA is very clear in this respect: “Diplomatic missions and consular posts 
of the Member States and of the Russian Federation shall issue multiple entry-visa […]” [emphasis added] 
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The issuance of multiple entry visa with a long term of validity has significant advantages. 
On the one hand, it makes the life of travelers much easier. This is particularly important in case of 
people whose occupations involve a lot of travelling to foreign countries. On the other hand, it also 
limits the workload of consulates, which deal with an application of a frequent traveler only once in 
five years and not some 20 or 30 times within that period. However, for a number of reasons, 
including the lack of clarity of the relevant legal provisions as well as reluctance on the part of 
national governments to apply them to the fullest potential, the issuance of multiple entry visa with 
a long term of validity turns out to be a rather rare phenomenon in practice.  
 The European Commission collects statistical data on the number of visas issued by the EU 
Member States, including the share of multiple-entry visas.99  
 
Table 1.  EU visa statistics100 
 
Total C 
visas issued 
in the world 
Total C 
visas 
issued in 
Russia 
Rate C 
visas 
issued 
in 
Russia/ 
in the 
World
101 
Rate to the 
previous 
year (in 
Russia) 
Multiple 
entry C 
visas 
(MEV) 
issued in 
Russia 
Share of 
MEVs 
on 
issued 
C visas 
in 
Russia 
Number 
of 
applicatio
ns for C 
visas 
C visas 
not 
issued 
Rate of 
refusal 
3 top 
Schengen 
consulates 
in Russia 
(number of 
issued C 
Schengen 
visas) 
2012 14 250 595 5 939 644 41.68% +15.28% 2 906 259 48.93% 6 069 001 54 860 0.9% 
FI (S. 
Petersburg)  
1 022 443 
ES 
(Moscow) 
873 812 
IT 
(Moscow) 
602 913 
2011 12 640 034 5 152 518 40.76% +25.04% 2 439 656 47.3% 5 265 866 77 509 1.47% 
FI (S. 
Petersburg) 
929 776 
ES 
(Moscow) 
668 279 
IT 
(Moscow) 
557 164 
2010 11 018 936 4 120 704 37.4% +30.2%102 1 753 536 42.6% 4 222 551 –– –– 
FI (S. 
Petersburg) 
738 505 
ES 
(Moscow) 
438 182 
IT 
(Moscow) 
434 921 
 
On the basis of this data one can see which EU Member States are more liberal in issuing multiple-
entry visas and which are less. However, in practice it turns out that all too often the multiple-entry 
                                                            
99 This information is available from the official website of the Directorate-General Home Affairs. For statistical tables 
and overview, please see: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-
policy/index_en.htm/.  
100 Ibid. 
101 Russia is an undisputed leader of the countries, where C visas were issued, around 40% of all Schengen visas were 
issued in Russia, the following countries in 2012 are Ukraine (1 283 014) and China (1 185 569).  
102 European Commission. Overview of Schengen visa statistics 2009-2011//http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/docs/overview_of_schengen_visa_statistics_2011_final_en.pdf 
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visas issued by EU Member States have a very short validity. In fact, it does not make much of a 
difference whether a visa is a single-entry or a multiple-entry one if its validity is limited to one 
month: it is not very likely that the same person will travel twice to the EU within the same month. 
If we look closer at visa statistics we will see that the largest share of multiple-entry visas are valid 
for up to one year (unfortunately it is impossible to gather more precise data, so we do not know 
what share of visas issued within this group are in fact valid for just several weeks or several 
months). What we see in Table 1 is that even if an overall share of multiple-entry visas issued by a 
given country is high (e.g. Switzerland with 71% of MEVs), the share of multiple entry visas with a 
really long validity, from up to 3 years to up to 5 years, is strikingly low. In all the three cases it is 
below 2%. Arguably, only such visas with long-term validity really make a difference in terms of 
facilitating the visa regime. 
 
Table 2. Share of MEVs according to length of validity103 
 
Single/ 
Double 
entry 
MEVs up 
to 1 year 
MEVs up 
to 2 years 
MEVs up 
to 3 years 
MEVs up 
to 4 years 
MEVs up 
to 5 years 
Total 
MVEs Total 
Share of 
MEVs 
Share of 
MEVs 
with 3-5 
year-
validity  
2012 80712 21432 23435 2030 250 15 47072 127784 36,8% 1.8% 
2011 329545 55220 8675 3524 0 751 68170 397662 17% 1% 
2010 18066 42845 1442 83 10 20 44400 62486 71% 0.2% 
 
One of the issues underlying such a situation are the sometimes ambiguous regulations regarding 
the issuance and use of multiple-entry visas, both with regard to the purpose of travel (business, 
tourism, visiting family, etc.) and destination countries (e.g. where one should apply if one plans to 
travel to more than one EU Member State). Responding to an enquiry by members of the Visa-free 
Europe Coalition, the European Commission repeated that multiple-visas are not purpose-bound, 
that is even if a given visa was issued for business purposes, it can also be used for tourist 
purposes.104 Yet, according to the EU visa code requirements, every applicant needs to give the 
main reason of their travel, which is then coded into the visa sticker. The same concerns the country 
of issuance: the applicant is bound to apply for their visa in the consulate of the country where he or 
she intends to travel most often, which for obvious reasons may be problematic, especially when 
applying for a long-term validity visa, e.g. up to 5 years. All too often, in order to be granted a 
multiple-entry visa valid for up to 5 years, an applicant is expected to demonstrate that he or she 
will be travelling regularly to the same country with the same purpose, e.g. to take part in a series of 
seminars or business meetings within the span of 5 years, which in most cases is simply impossible. 
Otherwise, applicants with a positive visa history (even 5-10 years of regular travelling to the EU 
Member States, always respecting the visa requirements) and with a clear purpose of regular 
visiting EU Member States (e.g. businessmen cooperating with international companies or scientists 
taking part in numerous international conferences) are granted visas with short-term validity, often 
for just one trip.  
 
                                                            
103 We have sent inquiries with regard to a detailed breakdown of multiple-entry visas according to their term of 
validity. Unfortunately only three Schengen countries sent the required information, others either sent only the 
information about the share of multiple visas without the breakdown according to the terms of validity or did not reply 
at all.  
104 http://visa-free-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/20120426105858243.pdf 
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Also for EU citizens regularly traveling to Russia, multiple entry visa are rarely used.105 This 
is partly due to limited options for issuing multiple entry visa under Russian national legislation106 
and partly due to a lack of information about the possibilities offered to those applicants that fall 
within the scope of the VFA. A particular problem exists for persons participating in scientific, 
cultural and artistic activities, which have a right to a multiple entry visa under the conditions of 
Article 5 (2) e) of the VFA. However, as such activities are often organized by different Russian 
institutions and/or taking place in different cities, it is not evident to satisfy the documentary 
requirements. Often, the organizers can only issue an invitation letter for a specific event, creating 
problems for the applicant to get a multiple entry visa.107 Moreover, Russian consulates and visa 
centers do not always inform EU citizens who fall into the latter category that they could apply for 
such visas. There have also been cases when Russian consular representations on the EU territory 
assured the applicants that they only had a right to visit the cities in Russia which they mentioned in 
the application form and which were pointed in the invitation, while this does not correspond to the 
Russian Federal law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” which 
grants them freedom of movement across the country with exclusion of territories where special 
permit is required.108 For instance, NGOs which invite EU citizens to take part in cultural exchange 
programs are often asked to change the invitation letter if it does not include a list of cities the 
applicant is going to visit, stating that otherwise this person only could stay in the region where the 
inviting organization is situated.109 
Similar problems also arise when a holder of a Schengen multiple-entry visa attempts to 
travel to a country different than the country of issuance or with a different purpose than the one 
stated on the visas. On many occasions travelers with visas issued by consular services of one EU 
Member State were detained when travelling to other EU Member States and their visas were 
cancelled or annulled.110  
Finally, the distinction between different professional categories benefitting from the EU-
Russia VFA is subject to criticism.111 Bona fide travelers not falling within one of the predefined 
categories cannot benefit from the facilitated regime when it comes to granting multiple entry visas. 
Moreover, the division between different sub-categories almost unavoidably complicates the 
administrative procedures as it is not always easy to define to which category an applicant belongs. 
Alternatively, it may therefore be recommended to focus more on a person’s track record of 
                                                            
105 Unfortunately, no official statistics are available.  
106 Art. 25.6. of the Russian Federal Law on the Order of Departure from the Russian Federation and Entrance to the 
Russian Federation provides that ordinary private visa are issued for three months; this is one month in case of tourist 
visa and one year for business visa. See: http://www.russian-
visas.net/general_information/russian_laws_and_visa_policy/.  
107 Based on personal experience of the editor. 
108 E0&0@) 11 "3':0 1 ?-/-,&%@'#=# .&:#'& #0 25 (4%) 2002 =. N 115-?B «! ",&8#8#6  "#%#G-'(( ('#$0,&''A* 
=,&G/&' 8 1#$$(9$:#9 ?-/-,&C((» http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/federal_zak/115-fz.shtm 
109 Information from the “German-Russian Exchange”, Saint-Petersburg, http://www.obmen.org.   
110 See, for example, the letter by Batory Foundation and Europe without Barriers organisation to the European 
Commission regarding a group of Ukrainian citizens travelling in Germany with a visa ussued by a Polish 
consulate:http://visa-free-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/multiple_visas_Batory_EWB_letter_to_EC.pdf and 
the reply by the EC:   http://visa-free-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/20120426105858243.pdf  
111 K. O’Connell, “EU Visa Policy: Squaring the Circle of Neighbourhood and JHA Objectives”, in: D. Mahncke and S. 
Gstöhl (eds.), Europe’s Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, Peter Lang, Brussels, 
2008,. p. 122. 
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legitimate visa use rather than on his/her belonging to a certain professional category.112  
4. Protecting the rights of visa applicants 
Organizations working on visa policy issues are regularly alarmed by visa applicants about cases of 
unfriendly or even outright rude behavior of staff in consulates and visa centers of the EU Member 
States and the Russian Federation113 as well as about an inadequate level of information provision 
about their rights within the application procedure. In this respect, it is important to recall that 
Article 39 of the EU visa code explicitly provides that “Member States’ consulates shall ensure that 
applicants are received courteously.” Moreover, consular staff is under an obligation to “fully 
respect human dignity” in the exercise of their duties and to ensure the equal treatment of all 
applicants without discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent provision included in the 
Russian visa legislation.114  
Also, there are considerable differences between consulates of the EU Member States and 
the Russian Federation with regard to facilities inside and outside the consulate. Some consulates 
still require visa applicants to wait in long queues outside of the building and do not even provide 
any shelter against natural elements. It is also worth drawing attention to the questionable practice 
of some EU Member States of charging premium rates for phone calls with regard to visa issues.115 
Taking into account that applicants pay high fees for visas as well as for visa centers’ services, it 
does not seem too extravagant to expect that consulates and visa centers should provide desks and 
chairs for filling in applications and waiting, photocopying machine facilities, photo booth 
stationary and computers (where changes to applications can be made) as well as fresh water 
dispensers. 
Apart from the basic rights of fair treatment of visa applicants, respect for the rule of law in 
the entire visa procedure also implies that there should be an effective right of appeal against 
refusals to issue a visa. This right is not laid down in the EU-Russia VFA but is based on relevant 
legislation of the parties. With regard to visas issued within the Schengen area, Article 32 of the EU 
visa code lays down that the visa applicant needs to appeal against the Member State that had taken 
the final decision, in accordance with the national law of that State. This means that the appeal 
procedures vary considerably between Member States and usually need to be conducted in the 
national language of the Member State in question. In different Member States the appeals need to 
be submitted to different institutions (e.g. the  Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration 
Affairs in case of Denmark, the Administrative Regional Tribunal of the Lazio Region in case of 
Italy, Administrative Court in Gothenburg in case of Sweden, and so on). In any case, it needs to be 
done on the territory of the Member State in question. This all makes the appeal a very complicated 
procedure that is available only to people who know foreign languages, understand legal procedures 
well and can easily navigate institutions of other countries, or are prepared to pay significant sums 
of money to agencies specializing in visa services. Otherwise, this procedure is virtually 
                                                            
112 Ibid. 
113 E.g. Visa whistle-blower webpage maintained by the Visa-free Europe Coalition: http://visa-free-europe.eu/about-
us/visa-whistle-blower/  
114 A general non-discrimination provision is included in Article 19 of the Russian Constitution.  
115 Interviews with visa applicants and information achieved via Visa whistle-blower webpage maintained by the Visa-
free Europe Coalition: http://visa-free-europe.eu/about-us/visa-whistle-blower/.  
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meaningless. What is more, the waiting times are usually long, at least several months,116 which 
means that all too often even if the applicant in question finally is granted a visa, the initial purpose 
of the visit may no longer be valid and the money for tickets and accommodation has been lost. 
With regard to the possibility of appeal against visas issued by the Russian Federation, 
Regulation No. 335 of 9 June 2003 on the Establishment of the Visa Form, Procedure and Terms of 
Visa Extension and Issuance, provides that “[a] foreign national may be refused a visa in the 
instances envisaged under the legislation of the Russian Federation. The duly authorized state body 
is not obligated to give explanations of the reasons for such refusal“.117 Hence, there is no specific 
information regarding the options and procedure to appeal against a visa refusal, even though this 
option is available under Russian national law.118  
Sometimes visa applicants living in other countries than the one of their nationality face 
significant practical obstacles to go through the application procedure.119 The EU-Russia VFA 
remains silent on this issue. It is noteworthy that, in contrast, the VFA between Russia and the 
United States explicitly provides that nationals of each party can apply for a visa at diplomatic 
missions and consular posts of the other party that are located in the territory of third states.120 
Under the conditions set forth in the agreement this possibility only applies to third countries where 
nationals are permitted a stay of more than 90 days.121 Nevertheless, such a right could further 
facilitate the right of visa applicants in the context of the EU-Russia visa regime.   
Finally, specific problems exist for representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs). For instance, NGO representatives coming to Russia often face problems to get the correct 
visa, implying that if they come with a tourist visa there is a risk to have problems with Russian 
migration authorities if they take part in conferences or seminars. In this respect, the updated VFA 
which is foreseen to include specific provisions with regard to ‘representatives of civil society 
organizations’ may be helpful.122 A perhaps even more fundamental concern is the practice of 
‘blacklisting’ certain foreign nationals involved in human rights work and journalism without any 
explanations or possibilities of appeal.123  
  
                                                            
116 See: http://appeal.com.ua/apellyaciya-otkaz-v-vize-v-strany-shengenskogo-soglasheniya.  
117 http://en.russia.edu.ru/information/npb/fzakon/post/335/index,2/  
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/,.2329.  
118 For an example of an appeal against a visa refusal, see Case 2-1575/2012 before the Pushkin District Court (City of 
Saint Petersburg) of 16 August 2012, available at: http://rospravosudie.com/court-pushkinskij-rajonnyj-sud-gorod-
sankt-peterburg-s/act-106222980/.    
119 For instance, a Latvian citizen with legal residence in the UK could not apply for his Russian visa in London but was 
advised to apply in Latvia. As the UK is no party to the VFA between the EU and Russia, the Russian consulate in 
London only accepted invitations issued through the Federal Migration Service. [Information from the “German-
Russian Exchange”, Saint Petersburg, http://www.obmen.org].   
120 See: http://moscow.usembassy.gov/new-visa-agreement.html.  
121 See: http://moscow.usembassy.gov/warden-message-russian-visa.html  
122 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-485_en.htm. Such explicit references to ‘representatives of civil 
society organizations’ have already been included in the updated version of the VFA between the EU and Ukraine, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/docs/20130701_vfa_agreement_ukraine_en.pdf.  
123 With regard to this practice in Russia and other former Soviet republics, see: Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 
Persona Non Grata. The CIS ban system for human rights defenders and journalists, available at: 
http://nhc.no/filestore/Publikasjoner/Rapporter/2010/Rapport_2_10_web_final2.pdf.  
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Part III Towards the Abolition of the Visa Regime: Challenges Ahead 
1. Legal options 
Recent practice illustrates that the abolition of a visa regime between the EU and a third country 
usually consists of three stages, including (i) the parallel conclusion of visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements; (ii) the adoption of a road map or visa liberalization action plan (VLAP) 
and (iii) the abolishment of the visa requirements. The latter can be done either through 
amendments to Regulation 539/2001, as has been recently applied in the EU’s relations with the 
Western Balkans, with the exception of Kosovo,124 or through the conclusion of a visa waiver 
agreement, as is currently planned with Russia (cf. infra).  
As the European Commission acknowledged in a report of November 2012 “[t]he most 
effective way to solve the visa issue, is the waiving of the visa requirement for citizens of a third 
country by transferring third countries from the negative list into the positive list attached to 
Regulation 539/2001”.125 The determination of those lists is based on “a case-by-case assessment of 
a variety of criteria relating inter alia to illegal immigration, public policy and security, and to the 
European Union’s external relations with third countries”. Consideration is also given to “the 
implications of regional coherence and reciprocity”.126 This non-exhaustive list of criteria gives the 
EU institutions and EU Member States a wide margin of appreciation to decide whether or not a 
certain country remains on the visa black list. 
Interestingly, in the same Communication of November 2012, the European Commission 
suggested to take into account the economic impact of the visa policy as an important element to 
decide whether or not a country should remain on the visa black list.127 Such an evolution could be 
important for Russia. The German Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations calculated 
that the visa application procedures cost the Germans and Russians alone an estimated 162 O 
million annually.128 A survey among 200 German companies revealed that 56 per cent would invest 
more in Russia and/or the EU if the visa requirement were to be lifted whereas almost 20 per cent 
stated that visa problems had resulted in the termination of business contracts.129 In other words, the 
economic cost of the existing visa regime between the EU and Russia cannot be ignored and is an 
important consideration in times of economic crisis. Apart from the negative impact on economic 
cooperation between companies established in Russia and the EU, the visa regime implies that an 
important potential for tourism is currently not exploited.  
Yet, despite this significant argument in favor of introducing a visa free regime through the 
amendment of Regulation 539/2001, this is not the option that will be followed with Russia. The 
Common Steps towards visa free short travel explicitly provide that the abolition of the visa 
                                                            
124 See e.g. Regulation (EU) No 1091/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ (2010) L 
329/1.  
125 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Implementation and development 
of the common visa policy to spur growth in the EU, COM (2012) 649 final Brussels,7 November 2012, p. 6. 
126 Preamble to Regulation (EU) No 539/2001, OJ (2001) L 81/1, para. 5. 
127 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Implementation and development 
of the common visa policy to spur growth in the EU, COM (2012) 649 final Brussels,7 November 2012.  
128 Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, ‘Roads to Visa-free travel’, July 2011, available at: 
http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/sites/default/files/page_files/Position%20Paper%20Roads%20to%20Visa-
free%20Travel_0.pdf.  
129 Ibid.  
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requirement will be based on the conclusion of an EU-Russia visa waiver agreement.130 The 
principle of reciprocity, which is so crucial in EU-Russia visa relations, as well as the possibility to 
introduce specific modalities to the right of visa free movement, e.g. by limiting this right to holders 
of biometric passports or certain categories of tourists and business people etc., helps to explain this 
choice.  
Following the EU’s common visa policy and the nature of the EU’s competence in this area, 
only the Union can negotiate and conclude a visa waiver agreement and not the individual Member 
States.131 In accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 218 TFEU, this implies that the 
European Commission will conduct the negotiations after receiving the negotiating guidelines from 
the Council. The Council shall adopt the decision concluding the agreement after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament.132 Taking into account the opt-out of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland with regard to the Schengen acquis, the provisions of EU visa waiver agreements do not 
apply to those countries.  
An interesting example of what could be achieved in the future is the recently concluded 
visa waiver agreement between the EU and Brazil.133 This agreement allows citizens of both parties 
to enter each other’s territory without a visa for tourism and business purposes for a maximum 
period of stay of three months during a six months period. The two purposes of "tourism" and 
"business" are widely defined in the agreement, including persons attending meetings, conferences 
and seminars etc. provided that no remuneration is received for their activity, and also visits of 
relatives and official meetings are covered by the categories of "tourists" and "business people" 
respectively. According to the EU’s estimates, these two categories would cover 90-95 % of all the 
travelers.134 Persons travelling for the purpose of carrying out paid activities are excluded from the 
scope of the Agreement. For this category, each Member State (and also Brazil) remains free to 
impose the visa requirement on the citizens of the other Party in accordance with the applicable 
Union or national law, or in accordance with bilateral agreements. 
The abolition of visa requirements on the basis of bilateral visa waiver agreements is also a 
common practice for the Russian Federation. In recent years, agreements on visa waiver have been 
concluded with a wide range of countries including Argentina, Columbia, Israel, Peru, Thailand, 
Turkey, Brazil, Guatemala, SAR Hong Kong, SAR Macau, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Chili.135 The 
                                                            
130 See: for the text of the common steps: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-
affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf.  
131 Pursuant to Article 3 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Union has exclusive 
competence for the conclusion of international agreements when its conclusion “is provided for in a legislative act of 
the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may 
affect common rules or alter their scope”.   
132 The consent of the European Parliament is required since the agreement covers a field to which the ordinary 
legislative procedure applies.  
133 Agreement between the European Union and the Federative Republic of Brazil on short-stay visa waiver for holders 
of ordinary passports, OJ, 2011, L 66/2. In parallel an agreement on short-stay visa waiver for holders of diplomatic, 
service or official passports has been concluded. The latter did not need to be ratified by the Brazilian Congress.   
134 See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&t
reatyId=9401.    
135 For a database of relevant agreements, see: CARIM-East Legal Database: http://www.carim-east.eu/database/legal-
module/?ls=3&ind=biag&country=Russia&country_fin=%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F&l
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agreement with Israel is of particular interest taking into account the strict immigration rules 
applicable in this country.136 According to this agreement, nationals of both states holding valid 
passports can enter and stay on the territory of the other state without obtaining a visa for 90 days 
per period of 180 days. Nationals of the parties who intend to stay in the territory of the other state 
for a period exceeding 90 days or to take up employment or to engage in business activities in its 
territory remain under an obligation to obtain a visa in accordance with the legislation of the 
receiving state. Significantly, each party reserves the right to deny entry to nationals of the other 
party “whom it may consider undesirable”, or to shorten their period of stay in the country.137 This 
very generic exception to the visa free regime grants a wide margin of appreciation to the national 
governments of the parties, which may go beyond the standard restrictive interpretation that such a 
refusal is only possible in cases of serious threats to national security, public order or public health. 
2. Common Steps towards visa free short travel of Russian and EU citizens 
2.1. Background 
In the context of the EU-Russia visa dialogue, both parties agreed on a list of “Common Steps 
towards visa-free short term travel for Russian and EU citizens” (hereinafter – Common Steps) in 
December 2011.138 The Common Steps include a list of actions to be implemented by  both the EU 
and the Russian Federation in preparation of negotiations for the conclusion of a visa waiver 
agreement providing for the abolition of the visa requirement for holders of biometric passports and 
limited to short-term travels (stays of maximum 90 days in every 180 day period).139 The Common 
Steps consist of the followings four “blocks”: Block 1: document security, including biometrics; 
Block 2: illegal migration, including readmission; Block 3: public order, security and judicial 
cooperation; Block 4: external relations. 
According to the Block 1, the Parties shall introduce ICAO-compliant biometric passports; 
ensure prompt and systematic reporting to the Interpol database on lost and stolen passports; 
maintain regular exchange of passport specimens and visa forms, information on false documents 
and cooperation on document security; conduct training programs on the methods of the document 
protection; as well as undertake and if necessary improve anti-corruption measures targeting 
officials of any public authority that deals with comprehensive and secure identity management.  
Block 2 commits the Parties inter alia to conclude the implementing protocols between 
Russia and all the relevant EU Member States to the EU-Russia readmission agreement; effectively 
implement the EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement; amend the EU-Russia visa facilitation 
agreement in order to further simplify visa requirements for the short-term travels; ensure 
facilitation, further simplification and transparent application of the respective rules on 
registration/listing of citizens legally staying on the other Party's territory, on issuance of permits to 
legally stay/reside and exercise labor activity; establish clear and transparent asylum procedures 
effectively accessible for persons seeking asylum; closely cooperate on the asylum related issues; 
                                                            
136 Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Russian Federation on the 
waiver of visa requirements for mutual visits of the nationals of the Russian Federation and of the nationals of the State 
of Israel, available at: http://mfa.gov.il/Style%20Library/AmanotPdf/4-27464-8887.pdf.  
137 Art. 2 of the Russia-Israel visa waiver agreement. 
138 Common Steps towards visa free short term travel for Russian and EU citizens (Russia-EU Visa dialogue), 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-
affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf 
139 Ibid. 
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ensure proper status for persons recognized to be in need of international protection; optimize the 
appropriate working mechanism for closer cooperation and more intensive contacts and information 
exchange between the Russian and EU Member States’ border services and effectively implement 
the working arrangement between FRONTEX and the Border Guards Service of the Federal 
Security Service of the Russian Federation; undertake necessary steps in order to develop 
cooperation between the Federal Agency for the Development of the State Border Facilities of the 
Russian Federation (Rosgranitsa) and FRONTEX; deploy appropriate staff, resources, technical 
equipment and infrastructure at the relevant parts of the state border, as well as effectively 
implement border control procedures and best practices at their common state border crossing 
points. This block also contains a detailed list of operational measures mostly focusing on exchange 
of information and trainings for officials in the above mentioned areas.  
Measures under the Block 3 imply that the Parties shall follow relevant international 
standards in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, in particular effectively 
fulfill relevant Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) recommendations; 
further enhance exchange of information and cooperation between relevant agencies of both Parties 
to effectively combat trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their 
precursors, and effectively implement the working arrangement between the European Monitoring 
Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and relevant agencies of the Russian Federation; 
exchange information on respective strategies and laws to fight trafficking in human beings 
including to protect its victims, in accordance with the Parties’ obligations under the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol on Trafficking in Human 
Beings and addressing possible deficiencies; ensure exchange of information and cooperation 
between relevant agencies of both Parties to effectively combat terrorism and trafficking in firearms 
and other serious transnational crimes, in accordance with applicable international law and 
legislation of the Parties; undertake necessary steps for conclusion and effective implementation of 
a strategic and operational cooperation agreement between Europol and the Russian Federation; 
undertake necessary steps for conclusion and effective implementation of a cooperation agreement 
between Eurojust and the Russian Federation; accede to and implement the 1980 Convention on 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibilities and 
Measures for the Protection of Children; accede to and implement the 1981 Council of Europe 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
and its 2001 Additional Protocol regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows. 
Operational measures in this block mostly focus on exchange of information on relevant issues, as 
well as on strengthening of operational cooperation between competent authorities of Russia and 
EU member states.  
According to the Block 4 the Parties shall ensure that all Russian and EU citizens and legally 
residing persons (regardless of the length of their authorized stay) can travel on an equal basis with 
the Parties’ own citizens within their respective territories, subject to their internal rules and 
regulations concerning national security; ensure full-fledged and effective issuance of travel and 
identity documents, including with regard to their price and deadlines of procedures, to all 
categories of persons for example to all citizens, internally displaced persons, refugees, non-citizens 
and stateless persons including to persons belonging to minorities; conduct training programs for 
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law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges and other practitioners in the areas covered by the 
present Block, and address possible deficiencies. The wording for the operational measures under 
this block that allegedly relates to human rights issues is very careful – the Parties declare only that 
they will “discuss and cooperate” on relevant recommendations of UN bodies, OSCE, the Council 
of Europe and international human rights organizations on the freedom of movement and 
facilitation of people-to-people contacts, in implementing anti-discrimination policies, protecting 
persons belonging to minorities and combating hate crimes and other areas covered by the Common 
Steps.140 
Importantly, after these four blocks of measures, the Common Steps document also includes 
so-called “final provisions”, which so far have attracted less attention than measures within the four 
blocks themselves. Nevertheless, these provisions are of crucial importance inasmuch as they 
contain a list of issues whose evolution and assessment “will be also taken into account”. These 
indicators include the rate of visa applications refusals; the rate of readmission applications 
accepted and effective returns under the Russia-EU readmission agreement; the number of return 
decisions with regard to citizens of the Parties, illegally staying or residing on the territory of the 
other Party; the number of refused entries at the border; the number of apprehended citizens of the 
Parties, illegally staying or residing on the territory of the other Party.141 From the point of view of 
the EU’s common immigration policy such criteria are essential for any assessment of migration 
risks and, consequently, for evaluating the readiness of a given country for a visa free regime with 
the EU. 
The structure of the Common Steps is similar to documents which are introduced by the 
European Commission to other countries seeking for a visa free regime with the EU. However, the 
difference with the “Visa Liberalization Action Plans” (VLAPs) with the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership (so far VLAPs have been adopted with respect to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia)  as 
well as the “Road maps” towards visa free short travel with the Western Balkan countries is not 
only in terminology. The Common Steps document has not been unilaterally imposed by the EU on 
Russia, but has emerged as a product of negotiations between the European Commission and the 
Russian authorities. Hence, one crucial feature of the Common Steps is underestimated by many to-
date analyses142 - this document is, at least in principle, much less of a conditionality instrument and 
much more a reciprocal mechanism insofar as “instead of just presenting Russia with a set of 
conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to qualify for a visa-free regime (as the EU did in the 
Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine), the EU agreed to design a set of steps for both sides to 
take, which underscored the equality between the EU and Russia”.143 The sui generis nature of the 
Common Steps repeatedly emphasizing their reciprocal character is not just a diplomatic move. 
Both the EU and Russia are under a commitment to solve actual problems. This is exemplified, 
                                                            
140 Remarkably, the formulation of the obligations under this block is more straightforward in the context of the Visa 
Liberalization Action Plans (VLAPs) with the EU’s eastern neighbors participating in the Eastern Partnership. For 
instance, the Action Plan for Ukraine inter alia requires ‘the adoption and effective implementation’ of legislation and 
policies on anti-discrimination. See: http://novisa.org.ua/upload/file/EU-Ukraine-Action-Plan.pdf.    
141 Common Steps towards visa free short term travel for Russian and EU citizens (Russia-EU Visa dialogue), 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-
affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf.  
142 With a clear exception of Hernandez I Sagrera, R. and Potemkina, O. (2013) Russia and the Common Space on 
Freedom, Security and Justice: Study. Brussels: European Parliament. 
143 European Council on Foreign Relations (2013) European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012: Russia. Available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2012/russia/14   
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among others, by the fact that the Common Steps address the so-called „Russian” problem with 
registration of foreigners in Russia, which is also an „EU” problem since registration requirements 
in various forms and of various degrees of strictness exist in a number of EU Member States.144 In 
addition, the document does not contain any direct references neither to EU acquis nor to EU 
standards to be adopted by Russia, which is indicative of the lack of “Europeanization” attempts 
from the EU side – as opposed to the cooperation patterns with the Eastern Partnership countries 
and Western Balkans. This is apparently one of the underlying reasons for keeping the Common 
Steps closed from the general public for more than a year after their adoption – till March 2013. The 
EU Council has underlined that “the content of the document was not communicated to the public 
by the negotiating partners and its unilateral release by the EU would negatively affect the climate 
of confidence among the actors involved in the negotiations and would prejudice the EU's relations 
with Russia”,145 thus, hinting to Russia’s unwillingness to disclose the text of the Common Steps. 
However, whereas the EU Council has concluded that “full public access … [to the Common Steps] 
must be denied on the basis of Article 4(1)(a)146, third indent of the Regulation (protection of the 
public interest as regards international relations)”,147 it has also admitted that “other similar 
negotiations are currently ongoing with several Eastern Partnership countries. The visa facilitation 
with these countries is a long term goal of the EU. As the negotiations which the EU is conducting 
with these countries have reached different stages, disclosure of the content of document 7973/11148 
would enable the negotiating partners of the EU to establish a parallelism and assess the EU's 
positions and willingness to compromise in similar international negotiations. This would not only 
weaken the EU's position in the said negotiations, but would also have an adverse effect in future 
negotiations on similar subjects”.149  
After the disclosure of the Common Steps, it is obvious that this list of actions is not a Road 
Map or an Action Plan in the bureaucratic terminology of the European Commission, since it does 
not set any chronological prioritization for actions to be taken and gives no promise of 
consequences once the measures mentioned in the document will have been achieved. The Visa 
Liberalization Action Plans for Eastern Partnership countries contain clearer-defined benchmarks 
and the process of visa liberalization is more transparent. The Commons Steps are more general in 
nature, which makes the process much more political, as it is not clear what level of implementation 
of each postulate will be deemed sufficient.  
                                                            
144 Details of these requirements can be found here: Notifications under Article 37 of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing 
the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code). The obligation on third-country nationals to report 
their presence on the territory of any Member State pursuant to Article 21(d) (2008/C 18/04), available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:018:0025:0030:EN:PDF  
145 Note from General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations on Public access to documents, Confirmatory 
application made by Ms Joanna Hosa (No 15/c/01/12),  p. 4, Available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st12/st12340.en12.pdf 
146 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
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147 Note from General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations on Public access to documents, Confirmatory 
application made by Ms Joanna Hosa (No 15/c/01/12),  p. 5, Available at: 
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148 "I/A" item note from the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia to the Permanent Representatives' 
Committee and to the Council. 
149 Note from General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations on Public access to documents, Confirmatory 
application made by Ms Joanna Hosa (No 15/c/01/12),  p. 4, Available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st12/st12340.en12.pdf 
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Importantly, the Common Steps document is a soft law instrument, which does not have 
binding legal power for the parties. According to its final provisions, once the implementation of the 
Common Steps is completed, the Parties will decide, in accordance with their respective internal 
procedures, on starting negotiations on an EU-Russia visa waiver agreement. This means that full 
implementation of the Common Steps does not automatically result in visa free short travel. Further 
steps in the visa liberalization process will depend on the political decisions of the parties. 
Moreover, despite the fact that a diplomatically drafted text of the fourth block of the Common 
Steps avoids direct references to human rights considerations sensitive for the Russian side, 
inclusion of such issues as freedom of movement within the country and access to travel documents 
might be interpreted as a link between the EU-Russia visa dialogue and the human rights agenda. 
However, this link is rather weak and a human rights-oriented interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Common Steps has been disputed by the Russian side.150 Arguably, the fourth 
block is where the approaches of the Russian and EU sides differ the most. Whereas from a Russian 
perspective, the latter block is more political in nature and, therefore, considered of less importance 
in comparison to the technical preparations for introducing the visa free regime, considerations such 
as respect for fundamental rights and values are crucial for many EU Member States and 
representatives within the EU institutions. 
2.2. Implementation of the Common Steps: state of play 
In order to monitor progress in the implementation of the Common Steps, the parties agreed to 
exchange expert missions under all four thematic blocks of measures. Results of these missions 
form the core of internal progress reports drafted by the competent bodies on each side. Progress is 
regularly monitored and assessed by the senior officials reporting to the EU-Russia Permanent 
Partnership Council, and is subsequently reviewed at the EU-Russia Summits. As it has already 
been pointed out by some researchers and NGOs, implementation of the Common Steps 
unfortunately does not involve any formal public monitoring, as progress reports are deemed only 
for internal use.151 However, an indirect monitoring of general trends is possible thanks to the 
annual progress reports on the EU-Russia Common Spaces that used to be drafted by the European 
Commission and are now in hands of the European External Action Service and other related 
documents such as progress reports of the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization, joint 
conclusions of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Freedom, Security and Justice and 
press-releases of the EU-Russia Migration Dialogue.    
The Russian side has also got the possibility to send missions to EU Member States only 
because the above mentioned logic of reciprocity is inherent to this new phase of the EU-Russia 
visa dialogue. Neither VLAPs with Eastern Partnership countries, nor Road Maps with Western 
Balkan countries provide(d) such a possibility for EU partners. Still, it seems that the European 
Commission prefers to see this common political platform more as homework for Russia. This, in 
particular, is signaled by the fact that apart from having sent to Russia two expert missions already 
in September-December 2012 that visited 52 “sites” including 4 migrants’ temporary 
accommodation centers, the European Commission sent to the Russian Government a questionnaire 
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151 Visa-Free Europe Coalition (2013) Common Steps towards visa free regime. Available at: http://visa-free-
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with 500 questions covering various aspects of the Common Steps. And after having received the 
collective reply of several Russian competent bodies, it has sent another questionnaire with 45 new 
questions.152 From the point of view of the Russian side, such time-consuming requirements lead to 
unnecessary slow-down of the mutually beneficial process and eventual postponement of concrete 
decisions. However, the overall conclusions of the EU expert groups composed of representatives 
of EU Member States, the European Commission and specialized agencies have been positive as 
regards the first three thematic blocks of the Common Steps – Document security, including 
biometrics;  Illegal migration, including readmission and Public order, security and judicial 
cooperation.153  
There has been indeed significant progress in work under the first three blocks of the 
Common Steps. With regards to the first block, in particular, Russia has started issuing biometric 
passports using the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The 
respective Presidential Decree # 1709 “On passport of citizen of the Russian Federation, confirming 
identity of citizens of the Russian Federation abroad, containing additional biometric personal data 
of passports’ holders on electronic chip” entered into force in January 2013.154 The Russian 
Parliament has also introduced several important legislative changes to the normative acts 
regulating migration control measures in Russia. The Federal Law #320-FZ “On amendments to the 
Federal Law “On the legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation”,155 the Federal Law 
#321-FZ “On amendments to the Article 26 of the Federal Law “On the rules of exit from and entry 
to the Russian Federation”156 entered into force on 11 January 2013. These legislative changes were 
in line with the prescriptions of the second thematic block of the Common Steps.  
Progress is also indisputable in the major part of the second thematic block of the Common 
Steps – the implementation of the EU-Russia readmission agreement, which has been clearly 
defined by the European Commission as one of the core pre-conditions for talks on visa-free regime 
on many occasions since 2006 when the agreement was signed. In line with the Readmission 
Agreement, Russia and the EU are obliged to readmit their nationals who are staying irregularly in 
the territory of the other party, as well as those third country nationals who transited through their 
territory. A special clause of this Agreement has given Russia a three-year transitory period, when 
the country had to readmit only its own nationals as well as the citizens of those countries with 
whom Russia itself had already concluded readmission agreements. During this transitory period 
Russia was supposed to take measures to secure its territory from migrants planning to use it for 
transit to the EU, as well as to prepare for readmission of irregular migrants from the EU. Such a 
preparation implied the establishment of centers for readmitted migrants, improved and 
strengthened infrastructure for migrants’ accommodation and border infrastructure, concluding 
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readmission agreements with countries on the perimeter of Russia, as well as concluding with 
individual EU Member States implementation protocols – de-facto detailed technical and 
procedural schemes – indispensable for the whole-scale implementation of the EU-Russia 
readmission agreement.  
Russia started implementing the Readmission Agreement in October 2007 – even in the 
absence of implementation protocols with EU Member States. It was the second country after 
Albania to do so. After these three transitory years (by the summer 2010) Russia has assumed 
responsibility for all irregular immigrants entering the EU from the Russian territory. To-date, 
Russia has concluded implementing protocols with all EU Member States that are part of the 
readmission agreement.157 The Russian Government has also managed to conclude readmission 
agreements with major migrants’ origin and transit countries, most importantly in Central Asia, but 
also with Vietnam and Turkey, whereas negotiations are under way with Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.158 The Russian Federal Border Service has paid specific attention to the improvement 
of infrastructure and border management schemes on the Southern part of the Russian border in 
recent years. Several centers for temporary accommodation of readmitted third country migrants 
were established with expert assistance from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
and financial assistance/monitoring from the European Commission.159 The Russian Federal 
Migration Service (FMS) has established good working relations with its EU-based counterparts 
and cooperation in migrants’ identification and removal is progressing smoothly,160 even though 
approximately 50% of all readmission applications from EU Member States to Russia are rejected 
by the FMS as ill-founded.161  
Importantly, as indicated by a representative of the European Commission, Russia’s 
adherence to the EU-level readmission agreement has been instrumental in stimulating EU Member 
States to use this legal mechanism  instead of other bilateral means.162 Prior to the entry into force 
of the EU-Russia readmission agreement, EU Member States and Russia (similar to Eastern 
Partnership countries163) used various legal mechanisms in their cooperation for expulsion purposes 
not limiting themselves to readmission procedures.  Once the EU-Russia readmission agreement 
entered into force, Russia – with the purpose to persuade the European Commission in its good will 
to properly implement the readmission agreement – has been consistent in suggesting EU Member 
States to cooperate under the EU-Russia readmission agreement instead of using other schemes for 
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“return”. The lack of consistency in EU Member States’ use of EU level readmission agreements 
with third countries as well as their ad hoc decisions to use other mechanisms for “return” when EU 
level readmission agreements could have been used, have been emphasized by the European 
Commission as a serious problem for the EU’s readmission policy in its evaluation report in 
2011.164 Therefore, the insistence of the Russian Federal Migration Service on the use of the EU 
level readmission agreement has been important for the development of the EU’s readmission 
policy.    
Overall, the EU-Russia readmission agreement has been characterized by a competent EU 
official as the only one that has been effectively used in EU readmission policy.165 This has to do 
with scale dynamics as regards Russia and, most importantly, with the need to extend the network 
of readmission agreements further from EU direct neighbors/partners to other countries in the 
world. Russia is the only country in the neighborhood that has actually gone in this direction – its 
contribution to the „domino effect” in the proliferation of readmission agreements is obvious and 
this is something unique. The European Commission has explicitly stated on many occasions that 
implementation of the EU-Russia readmission agreement will also be judged based on Russia’s 
success in concluding readmission agreements with important countries of origin and transit, which 
is much more than just an effective implementation of the EU-Russia readmission agreement per se. 
Such dynamic of proliferation is not the case for Moldova or Ukraine, for example. Therefore, the 
comment mentioned here refers to a broader context of EU readmission policy – its disseminative 
ideology – in which Russia definitely plays a bigger role than any other Eastern Partnership or 
European Neighborhood country.166 
The Russian side has also used its right to rely on expert missions to the EU and by February 
2013 has sent two joint missions that visited several EU Member States. Russian experts on 
document security, fight against irregular migration, issues of asylum and refugee protection and IT 
technologies met their colleagues and conducted field visits to various “sites” including centers for 
temporary migrants’ accommodation in Germany, Italy and Greece. The mission to Berlin turned 
out to be problematic, as the Russian experts planning to check the functioning of the asylum and 
refugee protection systems in Germany were denied access to applicants who could provide 
firsthand information on the conditions of their stay.167 Apart from this incident, Russian officials 
characterized these missions as a useful way of learning about the situation in the fields covered by 
the Common Steps directly from their partners in selected EU Member States. The missions of 
Russian experts uncovered some issues that normally used to be pointed out as Russian problems. 
For instance, Russian officials underlined that some of the EU Member States divert from 
internationally agreed standards on document security. The issuance of passports in Italy is done 
regionally, whereas international standards require the creation of a centralized passport-issuing 
body for diminishing the risks of theft and corruption. The Russian side also expressed concerns 
                                                            
164 European Commission (2011) Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements, Brussels, 23.02.2011, COM (2011) 76 
final. 
165 Nils Coleman (International Relations Officer, European Commission, DG HOME), questions and answers section, 
“The Management of the External Borders of the EU and its Impact on the Human Rights of Migrants: The Italian 
Experience. A Consultation between the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Human Rights of Migrants, Mr François Crépeau Civil Society, and Academia”. European University Institute, 
Florence, 3 October 2012.  
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about living and security conditions in a migrants’ camp near Athens where approximately 13 000 
migrants are kept without clear prospects for their further status in Greece.168    
The recently launched special EU-Russia Migration Dialogue is another important channel 
for fostering the implementation of the Common Steps. The first session of this dialogue took place 
in Moscow in June 2011. Since then, four more sessions took place in Brussels, Saint-Petersburg, 
Bratislava and Kaliningrad. The Migration Dialogue has finally provided for a venue to discuss 
possibilities of cooperation on different migration-related issues, not limited by the common interest 
to fight irregular migration. This allows both parties to approximate their positions on a number of 
tasks defined in the Common Steps. Importantly, during the last session of the Migration Dialogue 
in Kaliningrad, EU representatives confirmed that they “do not expect any risk of growth in 
irregular migration either from or via Russia”,169 which is clearly an important argument in the visa 
liberalization dialogue. Yet, such statements are politically sensitive and are contrary to  a 
widespread belief within the Union that an abolition of the visa requirement will go hand in hand 
with increased migration and organized crime.170   
In the absence of public access to Progress Reports on implementation of the Common 
Steps, an evaluation of the EU-Russia Migration Dialogue might also be used as an indirect 
assessment of the progress made with the Common Steps. The value of such an assessment is clear 
because the Migration Dialogue is part and parcel of the EU strategy to impact Russia’s migration 
and migration-related law and policies and thus might account for progress in at least some of the 
areas grouped by the four blocks of the Common Steps. In the most recent EU official evaluation of 
the EU-Russia Common Spaces, the partners underline “progress in the Migration Dialogue, 
implementation of its first Work Plan for 2011-2012 and adoption of a new one for 2013-2014 at the 
October PPC”.171 
The Common Steps also try to tackle the long-discussed issue of foreigners’ registration – 
de-facto mostly concerning EU citizens in the Russian territory and Russian citizens in a number of 
the EU states172 - in a very soft manner. The document says, in particular, that the parties shall 
“work to ensure facilitation, further simplification and transparent application of the respective rules 
on registration/listing of citizens legally staying on the other Party's territory” without any reference 
to potential abolishment of the registration requirement by Russia. Significantly, the proposal to 
cancel the registration requirement for all EU citizens coming to Russia for no more than three 
months under the conditions of a visa free regime was part of the draft visa waiver agreement 
presented by President Medvedev at the EU-Russia summit in June 2010 in Rostov. After the failure 
of this initiative, the Russian side has never reiterated its proposal in any official document, but it 
has been repeatedly mentioned by Russian MFA officials, emphasizing that this issue will be solved 
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once the parties reach a visa waiver agreement. 
This issue, as well as some other tasks identified under the politically sensitive fourth 
thematic block in addition to the concerns of the EU over Russia’s problems with corruption and 
border management,173 shadow Russia’s progress in what the Russian government believes to be the 
most important aspects of the Common Steps, namely measures aimed to diminish risks of irregular 
migration and other internal security challenges. So far, there is only very scarce data and almost no 
official information that would allow to asses – even though only en grandes lignes – progress 
under the third and fourth blocks of the Common Steps. The expert missions under the third block 
have been accomplished. However, it is very well known that negotiations on the operational 
agreement between Europol and Russia are stumbling,174 while indicators of a successful 
implementation of the measures under the fourth block remain unclear. Informally, the European 
Commission representatives say that Block 4 is the most problematic and still a lot needs to be done 
there.175 The expert missions (from both sides) on the fourth block will take place only in autumn, 
and then the drafting of the report will take some time, further postponing the outcomes of an 
already very long process. 
3. The way forward 
The importance attached to the visa dialogue by both parties is emphasized by the fact that 
“continued implementation of the ‘Common Steps towards visa free short-term travel of Russian 
and EU citizens’ including expert missions” is officially listed as the first among top three general 
achievements of the general EU-Russia dialogue in 2012.176 At the same time, as stated in the 
introduction to this report, even though the processes of visa liberalization and facilitation are both 
to be considered as self-standing and reciprocal processes, which proceed in parallel, there is a 
certain connection between the two in the sense that the effective implementation of the (updated) 
visa facilitation agreement is considered by the partners as one of the preconditions for progress 
towards further visa liberalization. This is, at least, an officially expressed common approach since 
it is included in the jointly agreed Common Steps document and also in the preamble of the draft 
upgraded visa facilitation agreement.177  
Still, one can argue that the undeclared agenda of the Russian authorities remains quite 
different – the emphasis is put on the need of the quickest jump to a visa waiver scheme and further 
visa facilitation is not regarded as a prerequisite for this long-awaited qualitative change in the 
bilateral relations. It has been repeatedly stated by the Russian MFA that negotiations on 
amendments to the current VFA and the visa-free dialogue are two different tracks. Russian 
authorities have been criticizing what they call the political – and, thus, in their view artificial – 
nature of the delays in the latter process.  
In other words, the Russian authorities emphasize that while the parties deal with concrete 
technical problems mentioned in the Common Steps – such as introduction of biometric passports, 
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improvement of operational cooperation between border services or changes in the legislation 
relating to entry and exit of foreigners – they always manage to find a compromise. Therefore, they 
draw the conclusion that more serious problems lie in the political realm and blame the EU and, in 
particular, certain Member States, for the lack of political will to start visa-waiver agreement 
negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been very clear on this point:  
“We are disappointed with insufficient progress towards visa-free travel for short-
term visits between Russia and the EU. The visa regime has long been an 
anachronism in our relations. From the technical point of view, Russia and EU 
Member States have been ready to waive visas for each other. This issue is symbolic; 
it exemplifies all the differences between Russia and the EU. It is ironic that our 
western partners, who were so adamant about freedom of movement when 
negotiating the Helsinki Final Act, are now reluctant to create conditions for free 
human communication on the European continent.”178  
A mirror approach exists within the European Union. In official documents the European 
Commission acknowledges progress in the implementation of the Common Steps, as well as the 
technical nature of prominent unresolved issues – such as the conclusion of an operational 
agreement between Europol and Russia – and admits that both the EU and Russia need time and 
resources to implement particular measures. However, at the discourse level and also informally 
many EU representatives reproach the Russian authorities for a lack of political will to deal with 
such issues as human rights, which the Russian side believes to be somehow irrelevant for the visa 
dialogue.  
As it has been noted, “Russia is dissatisfied with the slow speed of the implementation 
process [of the Common Steps] and proposes a quicker road map with a fixed date of starting 
negotiations on a Visa Waiver Agreement”. The EU […] views visa liberalization in a longer-term 
perspective”.179 Even if everything that is mentioned in the Common Steps is implemented – and 
thus so-called „benchmarks” are met – negotiations on a visa waiver agreement will not start 
automatically (cf. supra). A genuine benchmarks-based approach functions in a different way – and 
this has been amply demonstrated by the history of European integration itself, in particular, during 
the Eastern enlargement process – implementation of agreed measures naturally leads to an 
automatic step further. Therefore, in fact, the non-binding formulations of the Common Steps can 
hardly be named benchmarks, which is clearly an indication of the political rather than technical 
nature of the process. A wide margin for political manoeuvre is given to the EU by the very nature 
of its decision-making process: “as agreed in the Common Steps methodology, there is no 
automaticity and the Council's decision on this issue will take into account the overall EU-Russia 
relations”.180 This is specifically evident in the ambiguous positions of certain Member States, such 
as Germany, Scandinavian countries, Baltic and some Central European States referring to potential 
migration “threats” in case a visa-free regime is established.   
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At the same time, a no-risk statement on the potential migration pressure from Russia to the 
EU expressed by EU representatives during the last session of the EU-Russian Migration Dialogue 
in Kaliningrad (mentioned above) echoes several studies done to assess migration potential from 
Eastern Partnership countries to the EU in the possible absence of a visa regime. While studies 
produced by some of the EU security-oriented agencies, like FRONTEX, seem to be very cautious 
in their forecasting and are rather alarmist as regards potential migration risks, research done within 
academia is skeptical about the high risk of increasing migration pressure – in particular as regards 
low-skilled and unskilled workers – from Ukraine or Moldova to the EU.181 There has not yet been 
such a thorough study on Russia, even though already in 2002 in its very first reaction to President’s 
Putin letter proposing to abolish the visa regime the European Commission clearly identified two 
main problems that were supposed to be dealt with before the parties would start visa-free 
negotiations: crime and illegal migration.182 These requirements put forward by the European 
Commission have perfectly reflected the founding ideas and principles of the then nascent common 
immigration policy of the European Union and, in particular, its impact on the EU relations with 
third countries.183 In the mentioned Communication no reference has been made to such issues as 
human rights. At a later stage the whole visa dialogue has been diverted from the allegedly main 
focus of attention of the EU common immigration policy – prevention of irregular immigration 
risks, according to which a no- or low-risk immigration scenario as regards a third country should 
be considered a sufficient ground for visa liberalization – to a broader perspective including human 
rights concerns in Russia. Relevant indicators of the prospects for visa liberalization are also 
formulated in the final provisions of the Common Steps document (cf. supra). However, up to date, 
the Parties have barely discussed – at least in public – the actual meaning and importance of these 
concrete technical criteria relating to migration risks. Finally, only now – more than ten years after 
the seminal Communication on Kaliningrad transit – apparently the time has come. According to 
insider information, the European Commission prepares to ask several established academic 
institutions together with other important stakeholders to produce a detailed assessment of potential 
migration risks from/via Russia to the EU in a no-visa scenario.184 If such an assessment takes place 
any time soon and its results are taken into account by the EU side, the EU-Russia visa dialogue 
might take a much less political – indeed technical – and pragmatic turn. 
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Part IV Policy recommendations 
Based upon the above mentioned analysis, the following policy recommendations can be made 
regarding the processes of visa facilitation (1) and visa liberalization (2) 
1. Recommendations regarding the process of visa facilitation 
Amendments to the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement  
" The upgraded EU-Russia VFA should be concluded as soon as possible without being 
hijacked by the discussions on service passports. Freedom of movement, including the 
opportunity to cross state borders without unnecessary obstacles, is of great significance in 
people’s lives. For this reason, visa policy should not be used as an instrument to achieve 
other objectives. 
" Bona fide travelers with a positive visa history visiting the EU Member States or Russia for 
private purposes (e.g. visiting friends or tourism) should also be able to benefit from the 
facilitated visa regime even when they do not belong to one of the privileged categories of 
travelers mentioned in the (updated) VFA.  
The use of a harmonized list of supporting documents 
" The implementation of the harmonized list of supporting documents to apply for a Schengen 
visa should be carefully monitored by the European Commission. Moreover, it could be 
used as a basis for harmonization of the visa requirements with the Russian Federation. 
Further steps should be taken with regard to the harmonization of the documentation 
requirements. For instance, electronic means of communication, including fax and internet, 
should be commonly applied for transmission of the required documents, especially 
invitations. Electronic copies of invitations should be accepted by all consular missions, 
especially when sent directly to the mission’s electronic address or fax number by the 
inviting party. The issuance of invitations by hosts and sponsors should be simplified. A 
written letter of invitation signed by the inviting party and providing their personal data 
should be sufficient in such cases; there is no real need for official certification of such 
invitations as there is always a possibility of checking the data presented in such an 
invitation in case of doubts. 
" The focus of the consular authorities should be shifted to an assessment of immigration and 
security risks posed by the applicant, rather than justifying the need for frequent travel and 
documenting a single purpose of travel. What is more, annulment and revocation of a visa 
should be allowed only in cases when a visa was obtained in a fraudulent way and the 
person in question poses a clear immigration risk or is a threat to public security. 
" An online-based fully electronic system of applying for and issuing of visas without the 
need for an applicant to attend a consulate or a visa handling center in person should be 
gradually introduced. In addition, the use of eVisa as recommended by the United Nations 
World Tourism Organization should be contemplated in the context of EU-Russia visa 
 46 
relations.  The so-called e-ProVisa issued by the Republic of Cyprus for short-term Russian 
visitors could be used as an example. 
The use of multiple-entry visas 
" Multiple-entry visas with maximum term of validity should be issued on a regular basis to 
all bona fide travelers who need to visit the EU or Russia frequently. The third visa issued to 
the same person who has used her/his previous visas according to the rules should be valid 
automatically for 5 years. Successive visas should not have shorter validity than previous 
ones, unless there are serious reasons for granting a visa with shorter validity. 3- to 5-year 
validity visas should be granted to all applicants that fulfill the necessary criteria, 
irrespective of whether they have or have not applied for a visa with such long validity. 
Moreover, the upper limit of validity of visas should be extended to 10 years. A person who 
has used a 5-year visa, should be granted a 10-year visa upon next application.185  
" In order to ensure a better and more efficient use of multiple entry visa, the purpose of travel 
should be indicated only in case of single- and double-entry visas and not multiple-entry 
visas. In order to better monitor the issuance of long-term multiple entry visas, the European 
Commission should work with Member States to include the length of issued multiple-entry 
visas in the statistics they collect annually from the Member States. Similar statistics should 
be collected with regard to the visa practice of the Russian Federation. Only then will it be 
possible to monitor the effectiveness of the multiple-entry visa regulations as laid down in 
the EU-Russia VFA.  
Information and service provided to visa applicants 
" The European Commission and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should carefully 
monitor the work of EU Member State and Russian consulates/visa centers. Especially in the 
context of limited direct appeal possibilities, a dedicated website should be established with 
an e-mail address and a telephone hotline for reporting incidents of malpractice and 
misbehavior by consulate/visa centers staff. Consulates and visa handling centers should 
provide a ‘complaint mail box’ to acquire information from visa applicants about their 
problems during the application process.186  
" There is an urgent need to introduce a simplified and uniform appeal procedure, both with 
regard to being granted a visa with far shorter validity than requested as well as against 
decisions on annulment and revocation of a visa. Appeal cases should be investigated by an 
independent centralized body. Specific attention should be devoted to the practice of 
‘blacklisting’ persons without any stating any reasons or general reasons of ‘state security’. 
Persons included in such ‘black lists’ should be guaranteed a right of appeal. 
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" Further cooperation between EU Member States over visa application submission and visa 
issuance should be encouraged. This concerns not just the states that might not have 
diplomatic representations in Russia, but also those that have only one or two consulates, 
which forces visa applicants to travel long distances to apply for a visa. Yet, the 
establishment of a network of common EU/Schengen visa application centers appears to be 
an even better solution. This will help to further harmonize the EU visa policy, facilitate the 
access of Russian citizens to the EU as well as demonstrate the true spirit of solidarity 
within the Schengen zone. Such centers should also have a common online application 
system enabling application tracking, in order to limit queues and make the whole process 
more transparent. 
" Visa applicants should have a true choice between applying either directly at a consulate or 
at a visa handling centers. An equal level of quality is to be guaranteed. In this respect, the 
rights of visa applicants under the (upgraded) VFA should be carefully monitored.  
" Visa handling centers should be established in cities where no consular missions are already 
present. This will increase the options for visa applicants and avoid that long journeys have 
to be undertaken in order to fulfill the formal requirements. 
" It should be the duty of the consular/visa centers staff to inform applicants if they fall under 
a category benefitting from the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement. Also, relevant 
provisions of the EU visa code (or relevant Russian legislation) and the EU-Russia Visa 
Facilitation Agreement presented in a concise and clear manner should be widely available 
in both the consulates and visa application centers. One cannot simply assume that it is 
enough to make public the official texts of these documents as they are utterly unintelligible 
for regular visa applicants. Also, it should be a duty of the staff to inform the applicants 
about the possibility to appeal against unfavorable decisions as well as to lodge complaints. 
2. Recommendations regarding the process of visa liberalization 
" In order to make progress in the process of visa liberalization, the parties should concentrate 
on the implementation of measures that are of direct importance to visa/migration policy, i.e. 
measures dealing with the management of migratory pressure and security in the case of a 
visa free regime. 
" In order to assess the impact of visa liberalization, the parties should order an independent 
study focusing on migration flows and security risks in the case of a visa free regime. 
" The parties should use the criteria mentioned in the Final Provisions of the Common Steps 
(rate of visa applications refusals; rate of readmission applications accepted and effective 
returns under the Russia –EU readmission agreement; number of return decisions with 
regard to citizens of the Parties, illegally staying or residing on the territory of the other 
Party; number of refused entries at the border; number of apprehended citizens of the 
Parties, illegally staying or residing on the territory of the other Party) as the basic formal 
criteria for the evaluation of the parties’ readiness for a visa free regime. 
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" The process of visa liberalization should be as transparent and accountable as possible. For 
this reason, all statistical data relevant for the evaluation of the parties’ readiness for a visa 
free regime (cf. supra), progress reports on the implementation of the Common Steps, 
conclusions of the regular meetings of the Joint Monitoring Committees for the EU-Russia 
VFA and the EU-Russia readmission agreement should be made public. 
" The parties should commit themselves to start negotiations on a visa waiver agreement once 
they agree that the Common Steps have been successfully implemented. 
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